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CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRANT
ENTREPRENEURS (AND THEIR LAWYERS)
ERIC FRANKLIN AMARANTE*

Abstract: To escape the harsh conditions of work in agriculture or food processing plants, many undocumented immigrants turn to entrepreneurship for safer working conditions and better economic prospects. Transactional lawyers often help these entrepreneurs form limited liability companies or worker cooperatives. Unfortunately, this simple act might expose these lawyers to criminal liability. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) prohibits anyone from encouraging an undocumented person to reside in the United States.
This prohibition has been construed to include everything from employing undocumented housekeepers to procuring falsified documents for citizenship applications, and some courts have even suggested that the encouragement restriction
can reach legal advice. Although the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have construed IRCA's encouragement prohibition in a manner that avoids
constitutional issues, the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. SinenengSmith found IRCA's encouragement prohibition unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. This Article argues that the courts that upheld the prohibition rewrote the statute, usurped the legislative authority of Congress, and ignored the chilling effect this statute has on wide swaths of protected and socially
productive speech. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's decision signaled to
lawyers and immigrant advocates that providing comfort, inspiration, or other
forms of encouragement to undocumented people (including legal advice) will
not be treated as a felony. By refusing to rewrite the statute, the Ninth Circuit's
decision not only respects Congress's legislative authority, but it also represents
sound policy by supporting undocumented entrepreneurship-a boon to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur's family, and federal, state, and local economies.
INTRODUCTION

Some businesses, by their very nature, break the law. For example, an entrepreneur cannot take advantage of the nascent marijuana market without violating federal law,1 no matter how many times former Speaker John Boehner
© 2020, Eric Franklin Amarante. All rights reserved.
* Assistant Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. I would like to recognize the
generous feedback of Arldne Amarante, Wendy Bach, Michael Kagan, and Robert Statchen. I would
also like to thank Johanna Kalb and the other participants of the 2019 Southern Clinical Conference
work in progress session.

21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018).
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appears in a pro-cannabis commercial. 2 And if a business cannot avoid running
afoul of the law, a lawyer should think twice before helping an entrepreneur
form such a business. Such lawyers may be subject to ethical sanctions or
criminal liability. 3 But what if an entrepreneur asks a lawyer to help form a
business to run a fruit stand, a lawn care business, or a home cleaning service?
What could possibly be problematic about those businesses?
If the potential business owner is an undocumented immigrant, the answer is not clear. Although there is no law that prohibits undocumented people
from owning businesses, a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) criminalizes the employment of undocumented immigrants (the "Employment Restriction"). 4 And under certain circumstances, a
business owner may be deemed to also be an employee. Thus, when an undocumented business owner is also considered an employee, it would be impossible to operate an otherwise legal endeavor without violating the law. As a result, the operation of a fruit stand, a lawn care business, or a home cleaning
service may be as unlawful under federal law as operating a marijuana dispensary.
Nonetheless, unlike with the sale of marijuana-which cannot be done
without violating federal law-an owner of a fruit stand is not always deemed
to be an employee. Immigrants and immigrant advocates have explored structuring certain legal entities, often worker cooperatives or limited liability com-

2 See

his Dorbian, Looking to Make Millionsfrom Cannabis?Ex-House Speaker Boehner Will
Tell You How, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/2018/10/19/lookingto-make-millions-from-cannabis-ex-house-speaker-boehner-will-tell-you-how/#6d342b817c52
[https://perma.cc/74PE-X7L8] (discussing Boehner's online presentations targeted at an audience of
cannabis investors).

s Helia G. Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics in the Movement to Legalize Marijuana, 119 PENN ST. L. REv. 333, 348-51 (2014); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N, Discussion Draft 1983) (stating that a lawyer "shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent"); Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical MarijuanaBusinesses, 66 TAX LAW. 429,
476 (2013) (stating that "[a] lawyer or accountant who is considering providing tax advice to, or preparing the tax return of, a medical marijuana business must take into account the possibility that this
may subject him or her to criminal liability" and citing 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018) noting, "[w]hoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission, is punishable as a principal"); see also Brian Melley, Lawyers Handling Marijuana
Business Operate in Hazy Legal Zone, INS. J. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2017/12/12/473767.htm [https://perma.cc/9UBZ-F3VJ] (quoting Professor Sam Kamin
as saying "[a]ny lawyer that goes into this should be aware that a literal reading of federal law permits
such a [criminal] prosecution").
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2018) ("It is unlawful for a person or other entity ...
to hire, or to
recruit ... for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized
alien .... ").
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panies (LLCs), in a manner that avoids characterizing owners as employees.5
This is possible due to the relatively complex interaction between the legal
definition of "employees" and the rules governing worker cooperatives and
LLCs. Due to this complexity, undocumented entrepreneurs are wise to seek
legal assistance before forming such businesses. 6
Luckily, many transactional lawyers are eager to help.7 Although transactional lawyers have long "felt helpless" in the face of the myriad injustices imposed upon undocumented people,8 they are perfectly suited to navigate the
complex web of laws that governs undocumented entrepreneurship. 9 The very
knowledge needed-an intimate understanding of corporate governance, entity
formation, and employment law-sits squarely in the expertise of transactional
lawyers. As a result, many transactional lawyers have helped undocumented
immigrants structure businesses in a manner that avoids IRCA's Employment
Restriction.

Although such lawyers may successfully avoid their client's potential liability under IRCA's Employment Restriction, a lawyer in this practice would
be wise to review another section of IRCA, which makes it a felony to "encourage[] ... an alien to ... reside in the United States" (the "Encouragement
Restriction"). 10 This language, on its face, criminalizes any efforts to encourage undocumented people and is broad enough to potentially criminalize a
transactional lawyer's advice on how to structure a business in a manner that
avoids IRCA's Employment Restriction. In fact, some prosecutors have argued
that legal advice is covered by this statute.11 Thus, IRCA's Encouragement Re-

s Cindy Carcamo, Immigrants Lacking PapersWork Legally-As TheirOwn Bosses, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm-2013-sep-14-la-na-ff-immigration-business-

20130915-story.html [https://perma.cc/5X8G-J3AA].
6 But see id. (describing the experience of Carla Chavarria, an undocumented immigrant, with
forming a business). The article notes:
At a workshop hosted by immigrant rights activists, Chavarria learned about these intricacies of labor law-and how to register as a limited liability company. "I didn't know
it was possible," Chavarria said. "And it wasn't that hard." It was as easy as downloading the forms from the Internet, opening up a bank account and turning in paperwork to
the state along with a $50 fee.

Id.
See Gowri J. Krishna, Growing the Resistance: A Call to Action for TransactionalLawyers in

the Era of Trump, 7 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 206, 217-21 (2018).

8 See id. at 207 (describing how transactional attorneys "felt helpless and at a loss for how to use
their legal skills" to assist undocumented immigrants).
9 See generally id. (outlining a variety of ways in which transactional attorneys have assisted
undocumented immigrants).
° 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).
" See United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191, 203 (D. Mass. 2012) ("[T]he government
contended that an immigration lawyer would be prosecutable for the federal felony created by
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striction might dissuade lawyers from engaging in this advocacy in the absence
of clear guidance from courts.12 Unfortunately, appellate court decisions on the
application and reach of the Encouragement Restriction are at best uneven, and
at worst, conflicting. 13 Meanwhile, undocumented entrepreneurs and immigrant advocates are stuck in limbo as courts wrestle with the appropriate reach
of IRCA's Encouragement Restriction.

This Article explores the potential criminal liability imposed by IRCA's
Encouragement Restriction when a lawyer helps an undocumented entrepreneur form a business specifically designed to avoid IRCA's Employment Restriction. Part I discusses how courts have construed the Encouragement Restriction, including a detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Sineneng-Smith, which held that IRCA's Encouragement Restriction is
unconstitutionally overbroad. 14 Part II will discuss the phenomenon of undocumented entrepreneurship and the factors which make business ownership attractive to undocumented people. 15 This Part also includes an exploration of
preferred legal entities for such businesses. 16 Part III discusses IRCA's Employment Restriction and explains why transactional lawyers structure such
businesses as worker cooperatives and LLCs in a manner that avoids the restriction. 1 7 Part IV turns to policy by arguing that a strict interpretation of IRCA's Encouragement Restriction not only affects immigrant entrepreneurship,
but might also chill other legal advice to undocumented people. 18 This Part
closes with a discussion of some of the unintended consequences of adopting
an expansive view of the Encouragement Restriction. 19

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) if he advised an illegal alien client to remain in the country because if the alien
were to leave the alien could not return to seek adjustment of status.").
12 See Brief for Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project & the National Immigration Project of
the National Lawyers Guild in Response to the Court's Order Dated September 18, 2017, at 1, United

States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-10614) ("Amici are concerned that the
[Encouragement Restriction] can and will be used to criminalize and thwart advocacy on behalf of
immigrants due to the provision's sweeping scope and uncertain reach.").
13 Compare DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (requiring
"substantial" support akin to "an affirmative act that serve[s] as a catalyst for aliens to reside in the

United States"), with Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 467-68, 485 (holding the Encouragement Provision
to be "unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment").
14 See infra notes 20-121 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 122-191 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 224-293 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 294-343 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 294-343 and accompanying text.
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I. CRIMINAL ENCOURAGEMENT

This Part provides the background necessary to understand the Encouragement Restriction of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.20
Section A discusses relevant vocabulary and the rationale for selecting the
terms "undocumented," "immigrant," and "people" rather than "illegal" or "alien." 2 ' Section B discusses court decisions that interpret the meaning of impermissible encouragement per IRCA's Encouragement Restrictions.
A. "The Game of the Name" 23

Before discussing IRCA's Encouragement Restrictions and the phenomenon of undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs, it is wise to take a moment to
consider vocabulary. When referring to people who are physically present in
the United States without proper documentation, this Article intentionally uses
"undocumented" as opposed to "illegal," and will refer to "immigrants" or
"people" as opposed to "aliens." The words used in immigration debates are
fraught with meaning, prejudicial and otherwise. By way of example, consider
that the federal law refers to people without appropriate documentation as "aliens." 24 Despite the facially inoffensive definition of "alien" as someone "from
another country,"25 many immigrant activists 26 and governments (including the
State of California)27 have taken steps to cease using "alien" to refer to people
20 See infra notes 21-121 and accompanying text.

21 See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 44-121 and accompanying text.
23 See Steven Pinker, The Game of the Name, BALT. SUN (Apr. 6, 1994), https://www.baltimore

sun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-04-06-1994096202-story.html

[https://perma.cc/H49S-Z8SK] (highlight-

ing the importance of word choice and vocabulary as "language . .
24

25

See 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.1(a)

relates to thoughts and attitudes").

(2020) (defining the term "unauthorized alien").

See Jose Antonio Vargas, I'm Not an Alien,' L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.latimes.

com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0814-vargas-illegal-alien-20150813-story.html [https://perma.cc/8975-XM2G].
Vargas writes:
There are those who say that "alien" is a perfectly fine, neutral term, and that anyone
who finds it offensive is playing word police and should just check the dictionary. The
second definition, in Merriam Webster: "from another country." Sting's pop song,
"Englishman in New York," joyfully repeats "I'm a legal alien" in the chorus. Ian
Whitcomb, another English pop singer, wrote a memoir called "Resident Alien."

Id.
26 See Lauren Gambino, 'No Human Being Is Illegal': Linguists Argue Against Mislabeling of
Immigrants, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/06/
illegal-immigrant-label-offensive-wrong-activists-say [https://perma.cc/Y54Q-JYTU] ("'We don't
call pedestrians who cross in the middle of the road illegal pedestrians,' said [UCLA Professor] Otto
Santa Ana .... ").
27

See S.B. 432, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); see also Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown

Doesn't Want Californiato Use This Wordfor Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.
latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-jerry-brown-signs-bills-to-help-immigrants-20150810-
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in the country without proper documentation.28 This is because the word "alien," quite literally, exoticizes and otherizes those from foreign countries, and
conscientious people have advocated to avoid its usage.29
For similar reasons, this Article will not use the word "illegal" to refer to
people in the United States without proper documentation, nor will it use "illegal" as a modifier for "immigrant." The word "illegal," similar to "alien," carries a significant negative connotation. 30 For this reason, the term has become
disfavored by a number of major news outlets.3 1
To critics, these choices are merely an indulgence for the unduly sensitive
and little more than a nicety for the thin-skinned.32 It is clear, however, that
story.html [https://perma.cc/L6SP-UJ22] (noting a bill that removed the word "alien" from California's labor code).
28 See Vargas, supra note 25 ("'Alien' is now commonly considered a derogatory term for a foreign-born person and has very negative connotations. The United States is a country of immigrants
who not only form an integral part of our culture and society but are also critical contributors to our
economic success." (quoting state Senator Tony Mendoza)).
29 See Emily Bazelon, The Unwelcome Return of 'Illegals,' N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/magazine/the-unwelcome-return-of-illegals.html [https://perma.
cc/F2HF-L9GB] ("The term of art that statutes and courts have used since the 18th century-'alien'hardly bridges the gap. It comes from the Latin for 'of or belonging to others,' and was codified in the
first federal law that addressed granting citizenship to foreigners .... "). Bazelon also points out that
the history of its use betrays a racial component of the acceptability of certain "aliens" that is deeply
offensive. See id. (noting that the first law to use this term "allowed for naturalizing only an 'alien'
who was a 'free white person"').
0
" See id. (noting that this term "implies suspicion"); see also Dan Merica, Clinton Says Her Use
of Term 'IllegalImmigrant' Was a 'PoorChoice of Words,' CNN (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.cnn.
com/2015/11/24/politics/hillary-clinton-illegal-immigration-undocumented-immigrants/index.html

[https://perma.cc/3YVJ-38US].
31 See Drop the I-Word, RACE FORWARD: CTR. FOR RACIAL JUST. INNOVATION, https://www.
raceforward.org/practice/tools/drop-i-word [https://perma.cc/U538-MGYT] (quantifying the use of
"illegal immigrant" by The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and The Associated
Press). The article noted:
Since officially dropping [the use of "illegal immigrant"] in 2013, The Associated Press
has consistently been the best performer of these four major national outlets. While The
Washington Post has steadily improved its coverage each year, it has also consistently
been the worst offender of the four outlets studied. Although The New York Times never officially pledged to drop [the use of "illegal immigrant"], it has the second best record of the four outlets studie[d]. However, some of the publication's leading immigration reporters continue to use the term.
Id.; see also Stephen Hiltner, Illegal, Undocumented, Unauthorized:The Terms of ImmigrationReport-

ing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/insider/illegal-undocumentedunauthorized-the-terms-of-immigration-reporting.html [https://perma.cc/2PCG-ZHHR].
32
See, e.g., Hans A. von Spakovsky, "Undocumented Immigrant" Is aMade-Up Term ThatIgnores
the Law, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 30, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/
undocumented-immigrant-made-term-ignores-the-law [https://perma.cc/YPX8-ZDVD] ("'Undocumented immigrant' is a politically correct, made-up term adopted by pro-illegal alien advocacy groups
and liberal media outlets to obscure the fact that such aliens have violated U.S. immigration law and are
in the country illegally."); see also Gene Demby, In ImmigrationDebate, 'Undocumented' Vs. 'Ille-
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many anti-immigrant advocates use the term "illegal" to dehumanize immigrants. This practice has become so commonplace that such advocates, bristling at the perception of creeping political correctness, have weaponized the
use of "illegal" as a substitute for either "alien" or "immigrant" to signal an
aggressively anti-immigrant political stance.33 For these reasons, the term "undocumented immigrant" has grown in favor among immigrant activists.34 Indeed, a number of activists have adopted "No One Is Illegal" as a rallying
cry,35 echoing Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel's famous proclamation. 36 It is in this
spirit that this Article will refer to people in the United States without appropriate documentation as "undocumented." 37
This choice is not without its critics. 38 In 2018, the Justice Department directed U.S. attorneys to use the term "illegal alien" rather than "undocumented
immigrant" to more closely track the language of the relevant statutes. 39 Fur-

gal' Is More Than Just Semantics, NPR (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/
2013/01/30/170677880/in-immigration-debate-undocumented-vs-illegal-is-more-than-just-semantics

[https://perma.cc/J2JK-MSS9].
33

See, e.g., von Spakovsky, supra note 32; see also IllegalAlien or "Undocumented Immigrant?,"
FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (June 2009), http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/illegalalien-or-undocumented-immigrant [https://perma.cc/56P5-XJM5]. The article found:
The enablers of illegal aliens have engaged in a "political correctness" campaign in an attempt to suppress use of the legally recognized term "illegal alien" often asserting that "a
person cannot be illegal." Their alternative term is "undocumented immigrant." This term
blurs the distinction between legally admitted immigrants and those who have sneaked into the country or chosen to violate the terms of a legal entry. They have even gone so far
as to advance their "political correctness" efforts in legal journals and in the courts.
Illegal Alien or "Undocumented Immigrant?," supra.
4 See Demby, supra note 32 ("'Undocumented' and 'illegal' seem to be [about] signaling one's
stance when it comes to immigration reform [rather] than . . about characterizing the situation in a
precise way" (quoting linguistic anthropologist Jonathan Rosa)).
3 See NO ONE IS ILLEGAL-TORONTO, https://toronto.nooneisillegal.org [https://perma.cc/T3N7QHJR]. See generally JUSTIN AKERS CHACON & MIKE DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RACISM AND STATE VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER (2006).
36

Elie Wiesel, The Refugee, 34 CROSSCURRENTS 385, 388 (Winter 1984-1985). Famously, Mr.

Wiesel wrote: "You who are so-called illegal aliens must know that no human being is 'illegal.' That
is a contradiction in terms. Human beings can be beautiful or more beautiful, can be right or wrong,
but illegal? How can a human being be illegal?" Id.
3 The Supreme Court of California wrestled with this decision and came to the same conclusion.

In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 120 n.1 (Cal. 2014) (noting that "[a]lthough no shorthand term may be
perfect," the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that this choice "avoids the potential problematical connotations of alternative terms").
38 See id. at 135 (Chin, J., concurring) ("The term 'undocumented immigrant' is vague and is not
used in the relevant statutes. It is also euphemistic, because it is unlawful to be in this country and to
be undocumented in the sense in which defendants use the term.").
3 Tal Kopan, Justice Department: Use 'Illegal Aliens,' Not 'Undocumented,' CNN (July 24,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/24/politics/justice-department-illegal-aliens-undocumented/

index.html [https://perma.cc/JVU9-7EGR].
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ther, even some institutions that recognize the problematic nature of the term
"illegal immigrant" suggest that alternatives may not be appropriate. For example, while the New York Times urges its reporters to avoid the use of "illegal
immigrant," it also warns reporters to temper use of "undocumented" because

"it has a flavor of euphemism and should be used with caution outside quotation." 40 Professor Steven Pinker argues that the use of such terms are a part of
a self-defeating "euphemism treadmill" which ultimately results in negative
associations with the new terms. 41 Although such concerns have some merit,
the use of the term "undocumented immigrant" reflects an attempt to respect
the right of marginalized populations to self-identify.42 Even critics of euphemistic language might agree with this approach. Pinker, for example, in an essay castigating the spread of unbridled political correctness, said "[r]espect
means treating people as they wish to be treated, beginning with names." 43
B. Defining Impermissible Encouragement

On its face, IRCA's Encouragement Restriction prohibits an absurd
amount of activity. The statute imposes liability upon anyone who "encourages
or induces [an undocumented immigrant] to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to,
entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law." 44 Given that impermissible
encouragement could conceivably consist of little more than turning to an undocumented person and saying "I encourage you to stay in the United
States," 45 it is not outlandish to conclude that impermissible encouragement
might include most forms of socially productive and desirable interactions.
Part II of this Article discusses the potential reach of this prohibitionincluding how it might dissuade a lawyer advising an undocumented person to
form a business-but first, this Section will explore how courts have construed
this statute.

4' Hiltner, supra note 31.

41 Pinker, supra note 23.
42 See Vargas, supra note 25.
43 Pinker, supra note 23. To be sure, Professor Pinker did not argue that such respect automatically militates toward adopting politically correct terms. See id. Pinker noted that "[p]eople invent new
'polite' words to refer to emotionally laden or distasteful things, but the euphemism becomes tainted
by association and the new one that must be found acquires its own negative connotations." Id But
regardless of the author's differences with Pinker's ultimate conclusions, the maxim that one ought to
treat people "as they wish to be treated" is one upon which, hopefully, everyone can agree. See id
44 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).
45 See Sineneng-Smith, 901 F.3d at 479 (concluding that a person who makes such a statement
would be "vulnerable to prosecution" under the statute's Encouragement Restriction).
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46
1. "[Y]ou can't leave, don't leave."

Perhaps the first decision to question the potential reach of IRCA's Encouragement Restriction in depth was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit's 2012 opinion in DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties.47 In DelRioMocci, the court considered how IRCA's Encouragement Restriction applied to
a landlord who sought out undocumented people as tenants under the assumption that undocumented people were less willing to file complaints about substandard housing. 48 The court noted that successful claims under IRCA's antiharboring provision must include evidence that the defendant took actions that
"substantially facilitated" an undocumented person's ability to remain in the
United States. 49 This must go beyond "general advice," and must amount to
"some affirmative assistance that makes an alien lacking lawful immigration
status more likely to enter or remain in the United States than she otherwise
might have been." 0
In coming to this conclusion, the court expressed concern about the potential breadth of IRCA, stating that "reading the [Encouragement Restriction]
too broadly risks rendering the remaining subsections of [IRCA] redundant or
superfluous." 5 1 In this manner, the DelRio-Mocci court imposed a substantiality requirement to limit the reach of the Encouragement Restriction.52 The court
found support for this interpretation by surveying other circuit decisions5 3 and
ultimately concluded that the decisions only found liability "where defendants
were personally involved in bringing aliens lacking lawful immigration status
into the United States." 54 To rule otherwise, the court said, would result in a
statute that criminalized "giving any type of 'help' to an [undocumented immigrant], no matter how de minimis the assistance .... "5
The DelRio-Mocci court recognized the potential breadth of the Encouragement Restriction and interpreted the statute in a narrow manner. As such,
the DelRio-Mocci court's criticism of the statute is relatively subdued. This is
not the case in United States v. Henderson, a 2012 U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts case that cited DelRio-Mocci extensively. 56 Hender46 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
47 See 672 F.3d at 248-50.
48 Id. at 244.
49 Id. at 248.
50
Id.
51 Id. at 249.
52 Id. at 248-50.
5 See Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lopez, 590
F.3d 1238, 1249-52 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2002).
54 DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 250.
5 Id.
56 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 205-10.
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son involved the prosecution of Lorraine Henderson, a Field Office employee
of the Department of Homeland Security, who repeatedly paid an undocumented woman, Fabiana Bitencourt, for cleaning services.57 Henderson made these
payments with knowledge of Bitencourt's undocumented status and Henderson
repeatedly encouraged Bitencourt to stay in the United States, telling her "if
you leave they won't let you back" and "you can't leave, don't leave." 5 8
Ultimately, and with great reluctance, the Henderson court held that these
facts represented evidence sufficient to support a conviction under IRCA's Encouragement Restriction.59 But to say that the Henderson decision was delivered with great reluctance is something of an understatement.60 The court is
quite transparent in its distaste for the "stern, solemn, and implacable sanctimony of the government," and admits it is "puzzled" by the government's relentless pursuit in light of "the pedestrian quality of the conduct that is at the
core of this felony prosecution." 61
The government's argument in Henderson is fairly straightforward and
appears to arise from a literal reading of the Encouragement Restriction. The
government argued that "separately or together, Henderson's employment of,
and advice to, Bitencourt were felonious." 62 In terms of the employment alone,
the government's position was that "any homemaker who intermittently engages
an individual cleaning lady to clean the homemaker's residence, knowing the
cleaning lady is an illegal alien, would be prosecutable as a federal felon" under
IRCA's Employment Restriction. 63 This is not controversial. More upsetting was
the government's argument that Henderson's simple advice-which included the
statements "if you leave they won't let you back" and "you can't leave, don't
leave"-constituted a violation of the Encouragement Restriction.6
The Henderson court grudgingly agreed with the government's argument,
but took steps to communicate its discomfort with the breadth of the Encouragement Restriction. The Hendersoncourt was appalled at the notion that the
prohibition might permit prosecutions of "immigration lawyers for advising
illegal aliens regarding the circumstances under which they may pursue ad-

7 Id. at 194-96.
Id. at 195-97.
59
Id.
58

60 See id. at 193 ("I view the pursuit of this case to have been overkill through the improvident
invocation of federal criminal felony process when alternative administrative sanctions more closely
tailored to the significance of the misconduct are available and adequate.").
61

Id. at 193-94.

62 lot at 200.
63

lot at 203.

See id. at 196, 203 ("The legal logic of the government's position is that such employment
encourages' or 'induces' an illegal alien to reside in the country by providing an economic incentive
to do so.").
64
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justment in status." 65 The Henderson court rejected any comfort found in the
fact that such a case has not yet been pursued, noting that the lack of prosecutions can be attributed solely to the grace of prosecutorial discretion. 66 The
Henderson court ended its opinion with an observation that amounts to a warning: "The lessons of proportionate restraint while pursuing measured judgment, in the face of unreasoning outrage, require careful calibration of the level of culpability for modest misconduct. These are lessons often difficult to
accept, master, and deliver." 67 This thinly veiled condemnation of the government's unreasonably zealous prosecution doubled as a powerful argument that
any attempted prosecution of activity that amounts to "encouraging or inducing," and nothing more, would be injudicious. Although the Henderson court
viewed the government's prosecution as "improvident," and called the use of
IRCA's Encouragement Restriction in this case "overkill," the court was forced
to agree that the defendant's actions constituted impermissible encouragement
under the plain meaning of the statute. 68
2. "[T]o knowingly instigate, help or advise." 69
A number of other circuits have wrestled with the potential reach of IRCA's Encouragement Statute, resulting in a slew of conflicting decisions that
fail to provide a coherent definition of what, precisely, constitutes impermissible encouragement or inducement under IRCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has followed the lead of DelRio-Mocci, holding that any successful prosecution for encouraging or inducing must include a substantial
act. 70 For example, in United States v. Thum, the Ninth Circuit held in 2014
that "escorting [an undocumented immigrant] from a fast food restaurant near
the border to a nearby vehicle" would not constitute impermissible encouragement or inducement without an accompanying substantial action. 71 The
Thum court concluded that culpability requires "some action" that persuades
the undocumented immigrant to "live in the country indefinitely," such as
providing false identification documents for a citizenship application.7 2 In this
65 See id. at 211-12.
66 See id. at 212 ("To date [the government] understandably has not chosen to press the statute
that far.").
67 Id at 214.
68 See id. at 193. The court makes no effort to hide its disdain, especially given the availability of
"alternative administrative sanctions more closely tailored to the significance of the misconduct. . . ."

Id.
69
70
71

United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 2001).
See United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1146-48 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1144, 1148.

72 See id. at 1148 (noting that other cases find that "a defendant 'encourages' an illegal alien to
reside' in the United States when the defendant takes some action 'to convince the illegal alien to . .
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manner, the Ninth Circuit followed the DelRio-Mocci court and heeded the
warnings of Henderson,making it clear that any prosecutions for mere encouragement or inducement would not be upheld in the Ninth Circuit.
Thum echoes the holding in United States v. Oloyede, a 1992 U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit case that also required a substantial act to
support any finding of impermissible encouragement.73 In Oloyede, the substantial act amounted to a defendant not only selling fraudulent documents, but
also telling undocumented immigrants that the documents would allow them to
remain in the United States and even travel back to their country of origin
without negative consequences. 74 Although the Oloyede court did not directly
address whether the defendant's statements, on their own, would constitute
impermissible encouragement, it strongly suggested that the provision of
fraudulent documents was a determinative factor by noting that "[t]he selling
of fraudulent documents and immigration papers . .. constitutes 'encourages'
as that word is used in the statute." 75
In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v. He, which upheld a conviction under the Encouragement Restriction. 76 In He, the defendant objected to the definition of
"encourage" as "to knowingly instigate, help or advise," which was included in
a supplemental jury instruction. 77 Notably, this definition does not require any
substantial act, leaving the jury free to determine that mere instigation, help, or
advice would suffice for a conviction. Similar to the defendant in Lopez, however, the broadness of this definition was not necessary given the defendant's
actions. Consider the fact that the defendant in He was accused of altering a
passport, completing a falsified customs declaration form, and coaching an
undocumented person to disclaim knowledge of the defendant.78 Such actions
would certainly have fulfilled any substantially requirement and clearly involve more than mere instigation, help, or advice.
Thum, Oloyede, and He suggest something akin to a consensus with DelRio-Mocci, but other circuits have not followed suit. For example, in United
States v. Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2009 upstay in this country,' or to facilitate the alien's ability to live in this country indefinitely") (citations
omitted).

73 See id. at 1146-48;

United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]hey could

continue to work in the United States [, . .. they would not be subject to the threat of imminent detection and deportation, and. . . they could travel back to their homeland without risk of being prevented
from returning .... ").
74 See Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 137.
?5 See id.
76

He, 245 F.3d at 957, 961.

77 See id. at 957 (objecting on the grounds that these definitions were too broad).
78

Id. at 956-57.
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held a conviction for impermissible encouragement when the jury was instructed that "encourage" meant "to knowingly instigate, to incite to action, to
give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to raise confidence, to help, to forward, and/or to advise." 79 The Lopez court held that merely "helping" can constitute criminal behavior, noting that "in other decisions in this circuit, the
act[s] of 'helping' aliens come to, enter, or remain in the United States were
deemed violations of [the Encouragement Restriction]." 8 0 Although this language suggests that mere encouragement would support a successful prosecution under IRCA, the defendant's actions in Lopez would probably have satisfied the "substantial action" required by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. In describing the defendant's actions, the Lopez court pointed out that the defendant
"first had to take a boat to the Bahamas, refuel it, spend the night, pick up the
aliens from an abandoned hotel, and then go to the marina and come back to
the United States." 81 This litany of actions would appear to constitute a "substantial" act, but the Lopez court did not directly address the question.
Thus, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had the opportunity to come to a
similar conclusion as the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits and require the
prosecution to show some substantial act before a conviction under the Encouragement Restriction would be appropriate. The fact that they did not might
explain why the Ninth Circuit in Sineneng-Smith found that the Encouragement Restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. 82
3. "I encourage you to stay here."

83

Evelyn Sineneng-Smith, the manager of an immigration consulting firm,
repeatedly promised clients legal permanent residence through a long-defunct
labor certification program. 84 Sineneng-Smith's advice was largely directed at
Filipino clients who were "unlawfully employed in the home health care industry." 8 5 Despite knowing that the labor certification was not a viable route for
permanent residency, Sineneng-Smith told clients she could ultimately help
them obtain green cards through the program. 86 Relying on her advice, two of
the individuals she represented testified that "they would have left the country

" Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1247.

80 Id. at 1251 (citing United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 1252.
82 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485.
83 Id. at 467.
81

84 See id. at 468 (noting that the Labor Certification program ceased to operate in 2001).
85 Id.

86 Id.
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if Sineneng-Smith had told them that they were not eligible for permanent residence." 87
Recognizing the lack of guidance on the appropriate breadth of IRCA's Encouragement Restriction, the Ninth Circuit solicited amici curiae to address,
among other questions, whether the Encouragement Restriction is "overbroad
under the First Amendment, and if so, whether any permissible limiting construction would cure the First Amendment problem." 88 Ultimately, the court held
that IRCA's Encouragement Restriction was unconstitutionally overbroad. 89
a. Constructing and Reconstructing the EncouragementRestriction

A statute is impermissibly broad under the First Amendment if it reaches
a substantial amount of protected speech, considered in light of the legitimate
reach of the statute. 90 On the other hand, a statute may survive an overbreadth
challenge if the statute can be construed in such a manner that avoids "constitutional doubts." 91 Indeed, this is the course the DelRio-Mocci court took with
the application of the substantiality requirement. 92 In addition, this interpretation was likely on the mind of the government when it argued that the statute
should be construed as to only apply to substantial acts. 93 More specifically,
the government argued that the Encouragement Restriction only applies when
a person "(1) knowingly undertakes, (2) a non-de-minimis, (3) act that, (4)
could assist, (5) a specific alien (6) in violating, (7) civil or criminal immigration laws." 94

87 Id.

88 Id. at 469.
89
Id. at 485; see also Lauren D. Allen, Illegal Encouragement:The FederalStatute That Makes It
Illegal to "Encourage"Immigrants to Come to the United States and Why It Is UnconstitutionallyOver-

broad, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1205, 1233-39 (2019) (arguing that, under the overbreadth doctrine, IRCA's
Encouragement Restriction is unconstitutional). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit considered an overbreadth challenge to the Encouragement Restriction in United States v. Tracy. See 456 F. App'x 267 (4th
Cir. 2011). The Tracy court held "that speech . . that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting does not
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 272 (quoting Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128

F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1997)). The Ninth Circuit addressed this holding and pointed out the differences between aiding and abetting statutes and the Encouragement Restriction, highlighting the fact
that "[j]ust two lines below [the Encouragement Restriction], Congress required that anyone who 'aids
or abets the commission of any of the preceding acts' shall be punished as a principal." See Sineneng-

Smith, 901 F.3d at 482 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
90

§

1324(a)(1)).

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,473 (2010) ("[A] law may be invalidated as overbroad if 'a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552

U.S. 91
442, 449 n.6 (2008))).
Id. at 481.
92 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 241, 246-51.
93 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 471.
94 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit, however, was unwilling to follow the DelRio-Mocci
court's interpretation. Although admitting that courts should follow the canon
of constitutional avoidance-that is, to construct statutes in a manner that
avoids raising questions of constitutional law-the Sineneng-Smith court held
it would be inappropriate to do so when constitutional avoidance requires a court
to effectively rewrite the statute in question. To do so, according to the court,
"would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain, and sharply diminish Congress' incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place." 95
To adopt the government's construction-which, in effect, requires courts to add
"an act requirement, a substantiality requirement, and a causation requirement"-would amount to redrafting the statute. 96 Instead, the Ninth Circuit embraced the following, rather straight-forward, construction of the statute:
[T]o violate [the Encouragement Restriction], a defendant must
knowingly encourage or induce a particular alien-or group of aliens-to come to, enter, or reside in the country in reckless disregard
of whether doing so would constitute a violation of the criminal or
civil immigration laws on the part of the alien. 97
In a similar vein, the Sineneng-Smith court rejected the government's argument
that the words "encourage" and "induce" refer to "specific actions that facilitate" an undocumented person's actions. 98 This argument appeared to be designed to limit the prohibited activity to specific actions, as opposed to potentially protected expression. The Ninth Circuit, however, called this interpretation "strained," and instead adopted the plain meaning of the words because to
do otherwise "would require [the court] to conclude that 'encourage' does not
mean encourage." 99 To highlight the absurdity of the government's suggested
construction, the Ninth Circuit asserted:
[U]nder the government's reading of the statute, it would argue that
a mother telling an undocumented adult child "If you leave the
United States, I will be very lonely. I encourage you to stay and reside in the country" would not subject the mother to prosecution.
But, in this example, the mother is merely repeating the words of the
statute in an attempt to get her child to stay. We think any reasonable

5 Id. (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481).
96 Id. at 477 (citing DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 246-48).
97 Id. at 472.
98 Id. at 474-75.
9 Id.
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person reading the [Encouragement Restriction] would assume that
the mother's statement makes her vulnerable to prosecution .
100
b. The Encouragement Restriction Reaches Protected Speech

Having settled on the proper construction of the Encouragement Restriction, the Ninth Circuit turned to the second prong of the overbreadth analysis: whether the statute, as properly construed, restricts protected speech. 101
The court first considered whether such speech might be considered either incitement or speech integral to criminal conduct. If so, the restriction would be
upheld as proper, as these are the two exceptions to the rule against overly
broad speech restrictions. On the incitement issue, the court emphasized the
temporal aspect of the exclusion, noting that the government may proscribe
speech that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."102 However, because the Encouragement Restriction "does not require that an [undocumented immigrant] imminently violate the immigration law," the Ninth Circuit held that "the incitement
doctrine is a poor fit for this particular statute."10 3 The court conceded that the
statute may reach some categories of speech "exempted from the First
Amendment as incitement," but if any such speech exists, the court concluded
that "it is an extremely narrow band of speech and does not significantly reduce the scope of the statute." 4
The court also rejected the argument that the restricted speech is integral
to criminal conduct. For this argument, the government contended that the Encouragement Restriction prohibits actions that aid or abet criminal conduct.
The court did not agree for a number of reasons. First, the court was troubled
by the fact that the Encouragement Restriction applies to both civil and criminal violations. 105 To hold that the Encouragement Restriction was valid as an
aiding and abetting statute would represent an extension of the aiding and abetting doctrine to civil violations, an extension that the court was unwilling to

100

Id. at 479.

101 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) ("The showing that a law punishes a 'substantial' amount of protected free speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,'
suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, 'until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected

expression."' (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
102 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 480 (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969)).
103 Id.
1
04 Id.
105 See id. at 479-82.
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make. 106 Second, the court highlighted the fact that normally, "aiding and abetting requires that a principal actually commit the underlying offense," but
"[t]here is no such requirement in [the Encouragement Restriction because]
continuing to reside in the U.S. is not a criminal offense." 107 This is because,
absent certain circumstances, residing in the United States without documentation is a civil violation. As a result, the court concluded that "assisting one to
continue to reside here cannot be aiding and abetting a crime." 108 Third, and
perhaps most convincing to the court, IRCA contains a specific provision that
reaches anyone who "aids or abets the commission of any of the preceding
acts."1 09 Thus, the court was rather perplexed that the government would argue
that the Encouragement Restriction should be upheld as an aiding and abetting
statute when the statute itself contains a separate and explicit aiding and abetting provision.
Having settled upon the appropriate construction and concluding that the
Encouragement Restriction neither prohibited speech designed to incite unlawful action nor speech integral to criminal conduct, the court discussed "whether
the amount of protected speech the [Encouragement Restriction] restricts is
substantial in relation to its legitimate sweep."1 1 0 This inquiry requires a court
to determine if there is "a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the
Court."111 On this point, the court was unequivocal: the potential reach of the
Encouragement Restriction is absurdly broad and constitutionally unacceptable.
To illustrate, the court, quoting an amicus brief, noted that the Encouragement
Restriction would cover "'a loving grandmother who urges her grandson to over
stay his visa,' by telling him 'I encourage you to stay.'"1 1 2 The court also expressed concern that the statute might reach "marches, speeches, publications,
and public debate expressing support for immigrants."1 1 3 The court imagined a
hypothetical speaker who says:
I encourage all you folks out there without legal status to stay in the
U.S.! We are in the process of trying to change the immigration laws,
and the more we can show the potential hardship on people who have

106

See id. at 482 (noting that the government "points to no case where a defendant was convicted
for aiding and abetting a civil offense").
107 Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
108 Id.

09

8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).

10 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485.

" Id. at 483 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
780,
801 (1984)).
112 See id. (quoting an anecdote articulated in a submitted amicus brief).
11 3

Id. at 484.
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been in the country a long time, the better we can convince American
citizens to fight for us and grant us a path to legalization. ... 114
The court argued that even though such a speech would constitute neither incitement nor aiding or abetting, the plain language of the Encouragement Restriction would criminalize it. Such a conclusion would be unacceptable, as it
would result in "[c]riminalizing ... almost anyone willing to weigh in on the
[immigration] debate."1 1 5 This echoes the concern of the Henderson court,
which noted that if "all the government needs to establish is that the defendant
knowingly helped or advised the alien ... the statute may be deployed to criminalize any action, however modest, which may be construed to involve any
help or advice, however innocent in itself, to illegal aliens." 116
In this manner, the Sineneng-Smith court found the Encouragement Provision to be unconstitutionally overbroad.11 7 To support this decision, the court
cited a number of imagined scenarios that the Encouragement Restriction
would prohibit, including intimate conversations between family members 118
and political speech. 119 Wary of indulging in the "fanciful hypotheticals" discouraged by the Supreme Court,12 0 the Sineneng-Smith court stressed that these
scenarios "are part of every-day discussions in this country where citizens live
side-by-side with non-citizens." 121 The Sineneng-Smith court did not, however,
discuss the Encouragement Restriction's effect on a transactional lawyer's advice to an undocumented entrepreneur on how to properly form and operate his
or her business. For many transactional attorneys, this activity is just as important to highlight as family conversations and political speeches.
II.

UNDOCUMENTED ENTREPRENEURSHIP

This Part discusses the driving forces behind undocumented entrepreneurs
in the United States and the business structures available for such entrepreneurs and their companies. Section A discusses economic opportunity and
choice for undocumented immigrants in the United States and outlines reasons

114 Id.
115

Id.

16 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (alterations omitted) (quoting Fujii, 301 F.3d at 540).
117

Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485.

18 See id. at 484-85 (discussing examples put forth in the amicus brief).
19

Id. at 484.
120 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301 (2008) (bemoaning the "tendency of our
overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals"); Sineneng-Smith,

910 F.3d at 483-85.
121 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 483.
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they may choose to be entrepreneurs.122 Section B evaluates the business entity
options available to these undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs. 123
A. The Modern Undocumented Immigrant Entrepreneur

Immigrants represent an integral part of the U.S. economy.124 Given the
long history of immigrant workers in the United States, this should be no surprise.125 Although precise numbers are difficult to discern, most scholars estimate that there are about 10.5 million undocumented immigrants currently living
in the United States, 126 the vast majority of whom are vital participants in our
country's economy.127 Of most interest to this Article, a disproportionate number
of undocumented immigrants have proven to be quite entrepreneurial; eight to
ten percent of business owners are estimated to be undocumented immigrants. 128
1. The Undocumented Entrepreneur
At first blush, entrepreneurship might seem to be an unlikely option for
many undocumented people. Most states do not allow undocumented immigrants to obtain driver's licenses, leading one to think that a business license
See infra notes 124-191 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
124
125 Krishna, supra note 7, at 208.
See PANEL ON THE ECON. & FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION, THE ECONOMIC AND
FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 35 (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017)
("The United States began collecting data on the numbers and origins of arrivals by ship in 1820....
Based on [this] data series, at least 74 million immigrants have arrived in the United States since
122
123

1820.").
126 See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 FactsAbout Illegal Immigrationin the U.S., PEw RES. CTR.
(June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegal-immigrationin-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/5EAH-3MYF] ("There were 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the

U.S. in 2017 .... ").

12

Krishna, supra note 7, at 209 (citing Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Overall Number of

U.S. UnauthorizedImmigrants Holds Steady Since 2009, PEw RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2016), https://
www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/09/20/overall-number-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-holdssteady-since-2009/ [https://perma.cc/B8AL-GF4D]). Krishna noted:
The approximately eight million undocumented immigrants in the civilian labor force
made up five [percent] of the total number of people in the U.S. working or unemployed and looking for work, as of 2014. A higher percentage of undocumented immigrant men (ninety-one percent) between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four were working or looking for work as compared to U.S.-born men (seventy-nine percent) and lawful immigrant men (eighty-four percent) of similar age.

Id.
128 Michael Mastman, Note, UndocumentedEntrepreneurs:Are Business Owners "Employees"

Under the Immigration Laws?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y, 225, 225 (2008) (citing Julia
Boorstin, Illegal Entrepreneurs;Maria Has No U.S. Visa, and Jose's Expires Soon. Yet They Own a
Profitable CaliforniaFactory, Pay Taxes, and CreateJobs., CNN MONEY (July 1, 2005), https://money.

cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2005/07/01/8265279/ [https://perma.cc/NX5F-5X5F-5QDQ]).
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would be out of the question. 129 Further, one might assume entrepreneurship to
be impossible for many undocumented immigrants because successful entrepreneurship requires a certain minimum level of resources and networks. 130 A
number of successful entrepreneurs embrace and champion failure,131 but economic failure can only be absorbed by those with financial means. 132 For this
reason, entrepreneurship is not often a realistic option for many undocumented
people because they do not have the resources required to take advantage of
market opportunities. 133 Two notable professors write:
It is simply unreasonable to expect that those below the poverty line
could survive the losses that invariably accompany entrepreneurial
endeavors. At a certain level of poverty, the choice is between feeding one's family and nurturing a business investment, and it is untenable to expect an entrepreneur to make a decision that results in a
loss of food for her family. 134

1 29

See Gilbert Mendoza & Chesterfield Polkey, States Offering Driver'sLicenses to Immigrants,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 25, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/statesoffering-driver-s-licenses-to-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NLR-RA6C] ("Thirteen states and
the District of Columbia enacted laws to allow unauthorized immigrants to obtain . . driver's licenses.").
0
' Minda Zetlin, Do You Need a Wealthy Backgroundto Be a Successful Entrepreneur?,INC. (July
22, 2015), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/do-you-need-a-wealthy-background-to-be-a-successfulentrepreneur.html [https://perma.cc/HYS4-XNC2]. Zetlin found:
It costs an average $30,000 to start a company and the vast majority of start-up funding
comes from personal assets and investments by family or friends. In addition to start-up
costs, founders have to run their ventures for some time without drawing a salary. So
it's easy to see how having a substantial bank account, wealthy friends or relatives who
are willing to bet on you, and maybe a family or spouse who'll support you for a while
makes starting a business much more feasible.

Id.

See Eric Franklin Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism, 78 MD. L. REv. 1, 39 (2018).
This article notes:
131

In defending his embrace of failure, [Bill] Gates once noted, "Success is a lousy teacher. It seduces smart people into thinking they can't lose." . .. [David] Callahan quoted
Bill Ackman, a hedge fund investor and philanthropist, as being so "comfortable with
failure" that he admitted "there is some new mistake we haven't yet made that we'll
make in the future. But as long as we learn from it, it's fine."

Id.
132 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities,Not Entrepreneurs:A

New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 839, 843 (2014) ("[T]he
best innovations of social entrepreneurs have been captured by individuals and groups above the poverty line and often outside the inner city.").
133 See id. at 844 (noting that, because of their general financial status, most undocumented people are not "in a position to exploit the market in the way that entrepreneurship theory demands").
134 Id. at 861.
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Given this reality, one might reasonably ask why so many undocumented people decide to start their own businesses. Depressingly, it is because they have
no better option.
Unlike traditional entrepreneurs, who turn to entrepreneurship because
they have identified an unexploited market opportunity,135 undocumented immigrants are driven to entrepreneurship because the alternatives are terribly
unattractive. 136 For this reason, undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs should
be thought of as necessity entrepreneurs. 1 A necessity entrepreneur is someone who starts a business because they lack alternative choices. 138 This is in
contrast to opportunity entrepreneurs, who make business choices based on
their self-interested motivations. 139 A necessity entrepreneur is one motivated
by "survival," while opportunity entrepreneurs are driven by "the dream of
wealth," 140 a desire to not have a boss, 141 or even simple boredom. 142 Indeed,
one might consider an undocumented immigrant entrepreneur to be the quintessential necessity entrepreneur because, as the next Subsection will illustrate,
the U.S. legal regime prohibits traditional employment for undocumented people, leaving only poorly paid, unsafe, and undesirable opportunities. 143
2. The Shift from Migrant Workers to Immigrant Workers
Although entrepreneurship may not represent "a viable basis for systemic
poverty alleviation,"144 it is often the best option for undocumented immi135 See id. at 855. The article notes that the "entrepreneur's important quality of 'alertness to the
existence of opportunities that have been overlooked,' and ability to exploit such opportunities sufficiently to provide new resources and wealth for herself and those whom she employed." Id. (quoting
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 110-11 (1979)).
136
See Eric Franklin Amarante, The Unsung Latino EntrepreneursofAppalachia, 120 W. VA. L.

REv. 773, 782-83 (2018).
137

PAUL D. REYNOLDS ET AL., GLOB. ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, 2001 EXECUTIVE REPORT

4, at 8 (2001).
138 Id.
139

Id.

140 Scott A. Hipsher, TheoreticalView on MicroenterpriseEntrepreneurialMotivators, in CONTEMPORARY MICROENTERPRISE: CONCEPTS AND CASES 49, 51 (Joseph Mark S. Munoz ed., 2010).
141 Jonathan Long, 60 Reasons Why EntrepreneurshipIs Amazing, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/243389 [https://perma.cc/K3CU-SJZT].
142 Jacob Serebrin, FacingBoredom andLimited Savings, Seniors Turn to Entrepreneurship,GLOBE
& MAIL (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sbmanaging/seniors-turn-to-entrepreneurship-with-younger-partners/article32374241/ [https://perma.cc/

NY9A-EWQP].
143 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 774-75; Frank M. Fossen & Tobias J.M. Buttner, The Returns to Educationfor OpportunityEntrepreneurs,Necessity Entrepreneurs, and PaidEmployees, 37
ECON. EDUC. REV. 66, 70 (2013) ("[N]ecessity entrepreneurs would not be entrepreneurs if they had
alternative employment options.").
144 Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 132, at 844.
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grants. The story of the undocumented entrepreneur cannot be told without a
brief discussion of the evolution of immigration enforcement in the United
States. More specifically, this Subsection will examine how migrantworkers
became immigrantworkers.
Not too long ago, many undocumented workers spent as little time in the
United States as possible. Migrant workers, working primarily in agriculture,
would enter the United States to perform seasonal work and return to their
home country in the off-season. 145 From the migrants' perspective, the primary
reason to come to the United States was to find work and few had any interest
in more permanent residence. 146 From the perspective of the United States, the
agriculture industry required inexpensive labor. 147 The solution was the Bracero Program, a temporary guest worker program that provided temporary legal
status for around 4.6 million Mexicans to meet the agricultural labor needs of
the United States. 148 Bracero workers would work during harvest season and
spend the balance of the year in their home countries. 149
The recent debate concerning immigration makes it difficult to fathom
that, historically, many migrants were not interested in permanent residence. 150
This is, however, certainly true.151 In a study describing the migration patterns
of farmworkers from a rural Mexican town in the late 1970s, migrants held
permanents homes in Mexico where they returned seasonally to rest in between busy agricultural periods in the United States. 152 Indeed, this study noted
that "90 percent of the legal migrants . . . returned from their last trip to the
U.S. within 12 months of leaving ... and most of these (71%) returned in nine

145 Marielena Hincapi, Aqui Estamos y No Nos Vamos: Unintended Consequences of Current
ImmigrationLaw, in GLOBAL CONNECTIONS & LOCAL RECEPTIONS: NEW LATINO IMMIGRATION TO
THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 89, 94, 103 (Fran Ansley & Jon Shefner eds., 2009); see Philip
Martin, Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door, 36 INT'L MIGRATION REV.
1124, 1127 (2002) ("The demand for hired workers in agriculture is seasonal-more workers are
needed during some months of the year than others. . . . The migrant farm labor system depended on
an army of workers willing to accommodate themselves to seasonality.").
146 Josh Reichert & Douglas S. Massey, Patternsof U.S. Migrationfrom a Mexican Sending Community: A Comparison of Legal and Illegal Migrants, 13 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 599, 600 (1979).
147 Martin, supra note 145, at 1127.
148 Id. at 1128. This program applied to workers from "North America, South America, and Central America, and the islands adjacent thereto." Id.
14 Id. at 1128-29. It is important to note that the Bracero Program was adopted over the strenuous objection of labor activists. The labor advocates were drowned out by calls to provide "food to
win the war" in light of World War II. Id. The hollowness of this justification was made bare when the
end of the war failed to bring a cessation of migrant farmworkers crossing the border. Id. The Bracero
Program was not without its critics, but advocates made them politically palatable by tying food production to the U.S. efforts in World War II. Id.
151 See Reichert & Massey, supra note 146, at 606.
151 Id.

152 Id. at 600-01, 613.
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months or less."1 5 3 The study concluded that although a high number of migrants make the trip to the United States for work, these migrants do not aspire
to permanently move to the United States. 154 In something of a prediction of
future immigration policy, the report pointed out that the migrants who returned to Mexico were those who were legally permitted to engage in the
work, while those without permission (i.e., undocumented immigrants) were
less likely to return to their homes in Mexico. 155 These undocumented workers,
representing a minority of the migrants, were more likely to spend as much
time as possible in the United States. 156 The authors attributed this to "the high
risk of detection faced by [undocumented immigrants] while crossing the border" and emphasized the "clear incentive" to stay in the United States longer in
order to "maximize earnings." 157 Thus, while certainly unintended, the enforcement of immigration laws resulted in undocumented immigrants spending more
time in the United States, a practice that increased in the ensuing decades.
These unintended consequences were magnified by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which made
it much more difficult for migrants to cross the border at the beginning and end
of each harvesting season. 158 The intent of IIRIRA was to "curtail unlawful
immigration" and punish employers who violated IRCA's Employment Restrictions. 159 IIRIRA, however, not only failed to meet the intended goal of
curbing immigration, but it also resulted in a number of unintended consequences. 160 Undocumented immigrants were already incentivized to spend as
much time as possible in the United States, but IIRIRA's "bars to reentry"
made that incentive much more powerful. 161 These bars to reentry required
undocumented immigrants to wait a period of time-in some instances up to
ten years-before they were permitted to reenter the United States. 162 This is
true even if the person would otherwise be qualified to enter. 163 These bars to
153 Id. at 606.
154 Id. at 600.
155 Id. at 613.
156

Id.

157 See id. at 613-14 ("In this way, an [undocumented immigrant] can send or bring home more

money, and thereby put off the time when he must risk another crossing into the United States.").

See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
158

159 See Hincapi6, supra note 145, at 100.
160

See generally id. (arguing that a holistic global perspective is required to properly understand

and tackle the issue of immigration).
161 See IIRIRA § 301; see also Hincapi6, supra note 145, at 103.
162

See IIRIRA

§ 301.

163 See id. If, for example, a person had a valid family or employment-based petition, IIRIRA's
bars would apply. Id.; see also Hincapi6, supra note 145, at 103. IIRIRA imposes a three-year bar
upon any person who leaves the United States after more than 180 days of unlawful residence and a
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reentry are triggered when a person leaves the United States and tries to reenter,
and therefore IIRIRA serves as a strong incentive for many undocumented people to simply remain in the United States. 164 One scholar observes, "[b]ecause
workers without papers find it more and more difficult to maintain their traditional commuting pattern across the border, they opt to bring their families and
settle them permanently on the U.S. side." 165 Another scholar notes that this
phenomenon is further explained by the rationale underlying the decision of
many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States by saying:
[A]n immigrant can avoid being subject to [IIRIRA's bars to reentry]
if she never leaves the United States. Undocumented immigrants
who dream of eventual citizenship or lawful permanent residence
and who receive well-informed advice, soon learn that departing
from the United States will quite likely delay or destroy their chances of achieving lawful status. In essence, the penalties created by
IIRIRA have had the unintended consequence of locking in many
undocumented people who do not want to risk triggering the bars. 166
In sum, after decades of encouraging both lawful and unlawful migration for
agricultural labor, the United States passed a series of laws that resulted in
criminalizing the employment of undocumented people, disrupted the traditional migration patterns that permitted an immigrant to move back and forth
between Mexico and the United States, and incentivized undocumented people
to establish more permanent lives in the United States. 167 As the next Subsection explains, once these former migrants were effectively trapped in the United States as immigrants, it became clear that continued work in agriculture was
not a viable long-term profession.

ten-year bar for any person who unlawfully resides in the United States for over a year. Any violation
of these bars results in a permanent bar. See IIRIRA § 240A.
164

See IIRIRA

§ 240A.

165 Alejandro Portes, The New Latin Nation:Immigration andthe HispanicPopulationof the United
States, in A COMPANION TO LATINA/O STUDIES 15, 18 (Juan Flores & Renato Rosaldo eds., 2009).
166 Hincapi&, supra note 145, at 103-04.
167 Although this Subsection argues that there are numerous reasons for an undocumented immigrant to avoid crossing the border, a significant number of workers continues to repeatedly cross the
border to follow seasonal work. As a recent study notes, "large numbers [of undocumented immigrants] also move both ways across the U.S.-Mexico border throughout the year, sometimes staying
for only a few months .... " Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Mexican Immigrants: How Many
Come? How Many Leave?, PEw RES. CTR. (July 22, 2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/
2009/07/22/mexican-immigrants-how-many-come-how-many-leave/ [https://perma.cc/F5PX-RYGJ].
The study also observes that "Mexican-U.S. migration also tends to be seasonal, with larger northbound flows in the spring and summer and larger southbound flows in the fall and winter." Id.
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3. From Agriculture to Food Processing to Business Ownership
Although the promise of agricultural work drew most undocumented immigrants to the United States, 168 many immigrants do not view farm labor as a
permanent or long-term option for a number of reasons. 169 First of all, farm
work is physically demanding. As described by a migrant farmworker,
"[a]griculture is very heavy work ... [; w]e toil from sunrise until our bodies
can't take any more." 1 7 0 The punishing nature of agricultural work might be
best explained by the attrition rate of U.S. citizens who try their hand at farm
work. 171 According to one study, of the 143 U.S. citizens who started working
in the fields during the 2012 harvest season in North Carolina, only ten completed the season.17 2 This rate of attrition-approximately 93%-is even more
alarming when one considers the relatively high unemployment rate of 9.52%
at the time. 173 Further, that year was not an anomaly. In 2011, when the unemployment rate was even higher at 10.51%, only seven of 163 U.S. citizens
completed the season, resulting in an attrition rate of 95.7%.174 For these reasons, at least one farm owner openly preferred immigrant workers, saying that
he considers U.S. citizens "the labor pool of last resort." 17 5
Perhaps the physically demanding work would be sufferable if the pay
were commensurate with the difficulty of the labor. Unfortunately, farm work
is notoriously poorly remunerated. 176 Labor rights activist Cdsar Chavez famously described farm workers as,

168 See Martin, supra note 145, at 1139 (noting that "ruralMexicans often begin their American
journey in U.S. fields and farm-related industries such as meat and poultry processing").
169 See id. at 1133 ("Most of the [workers authorized under IRCA's Special Agriculture Worker
program] who were in their twenties in the late 1980s have moved out of farm work .... ").

170 Brian Barth, The High Cost of Cheap Labor, MOD. FARMER (Feb. 21, 2017), https://modern
farmer.com/2017/02/migrant-farm-workers-the-high-cost-of-cheap-labor/

[https://perma.cc/VX3E-

DLWB].
171 MICHAEL A. CLEMENS, P'SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON. & CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., INTERNATIONAL HARVEST: A CASE STUDY OF HOw FOREIGN WORKERS HELP AMERICAN FARMS GROW
CROPS-AND THE ECONOMY 4-7 (2013), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/international-

harvest.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DCQ-NJ59].
172 Id. at 10.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Barth, supra note 170. The reasons farmers prefer immigrant labor are as predictable as they

are hilarious. As one farmer said, "The one kid couldn't stop texting while he was on the plow. The
other kid was just dense. How many times can you turn to someone and say, 'You know, you missed
fruit on that plant?' A bunch of stuff rotted in the field." Id. (quoting a farmer from Valatie, New

York).
176

See STEVE CLAPP, FIXING THE FOOD SYSTEM: CHANGING HOW WE PRODUCE AND CONSUME
FOOD 142 (2017) ("Farmworkers still have the lowest annual family incomes of any U.S. wage and
salary workers .... ").
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involved in the planting and the cultivation and the harvesting of the
greatest abundance of food known in this society. They bring in so
much food to feed you and me and the whole country and enough
food to export to other places. The ironic thing and the tragic thing
is that after they make this tremendous contribution, they don't have
any money or any food left for themselves. 177
This bitter irony-that those who pick our fruits and vegetables cannot afford
to buy sufficient food-is compounded by the seasonal nature of most agricultural work. 178 Once harvest time has passed, the work in the fields dries up.
Thus, not only does the work not pay well, but the work is intermittent. Of
course, this seasonality was once a positive aspect of migrant farm work because it allowed migrant workers to return to their home countries during the
off-season. Once IIRIRA established the reentry bars, however, immigrants
who were virtually trapped in the United States began to seek more consistent,
year-round work.
Without proper documentation, job opportunities outside of agriculture
for immigrants are extremely limited. More often than not, the only available
alternatives for undocumented immigrants are slaughterhouses, poultry plants,
and various meat processing facilities. 179 Although these jobs provide more
consistent work, there is a reason these jobs are available: working in food
processing plants is notoriously difficult, 180 dangerous, 181 and unpleasant. 182
177 Speech at Convention of InternationalUnion, UnitedAutomobile, Aerospace andAgricultural
Implement Workers ofAmerica, Los Angeles, June 1974, in THE WORDS OF CESAR CHAVEZ 79, 8687 (Richard J. Jensen & John C. Hammerback eds., 2002) [hereinafter Speech at Convention ofInternational Union].
18 See CLAPP, supra note 176, at 142 ("Farm work is seasonal, strenuous, and dangerous . .
see also Speech at Convention of InternationalUnion, supra note 177, at 86-87.
19 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 775, 781.
' 80 See Peggy Lowe, Working 'The Chain, 'Slaughterhouse Workers FaceLifelong Injuries, NPR

(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/11/489468205/working-the-chainslaughterhouse-workers-face-lifelong-injuries [https://perma.cc/AMM5-QDS8] (describing "punishing rates of production" resulting in "a lifetime of pain and physical problems"); see also Amarante,
supra note 136, at 782 (stating that "[t]o make matters worse, workers in meat processing plants are
routinely overworked and mistreated with reports of not only dangerous conditions, but also insufficient bathroom breaks that require workers to wear adult diapers").
181
See U.S. GOV' T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-337, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH:
ADDITIONAL DATA NEEDED TO ADDRESS CONTINUED HAZARDS IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY 21 (2016) (noting that employees in meat processing plants "fac[e] hazardous work conditions . . . including hazards associated with musculoskeletal disorders, chemical hazards, biological
hazards from pathogens and animals, and traumatic injury hazards from machines and tools"); Michael Grabell, Exploitation andAbuse at the Chicken Plant,NEW YORKER (May 1, 2017), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/exploitation-and-abuse-at-the-chicken-plant
[https://perma.cc/

9Q86-N3G3].
182 See Tess Owen, Chicken Industry Workers Wear Diapers Because Bosses Allow No Breaks,
NGO Says, VICE (May 11, 2016), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/59ea3x/chicken-industry-
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Further, similar to most jobs available to undocumented immigrants, food processing plant positions pay extraordinarily low wages. 183 Needless to say, in
addition to these negatives, there is virtually no promise of advancement in
these jobs. 184
Thus, without authorization to work in the United States, the only choice
presented to many undocumented immigrants is either the intermittent and
poorly paid work on farms or the disgusting and dangerous work in food processing plants. It should therefore be no surprise that many immigrants look
for other opportunities to support their families.
Faced with the choice of work on the farm or in the factory, and virtually
prohibited from leaving the United States without forgoing future opportunities
within the country due to IIRIRA, it is little wonder that many undocumented
immigrants turn to entrepreneurship. Despite the fact that the entrepreneurship
of many undocumented immigrants is far from glamorous, often consisting of
domestic work or landscaping, "the preponderance of research in the area suggests that, even in its less attractive forms, self-employment offers immigrants
better outcomes than other available options" and such entrepreneurs fare better economically. 185
Given the improved economic prospects, undocumented entrepreneurship
certainly provides a benefit for the individual entrepreneur and the entrepreneur's family. Compared to work in agriculture or food processing plants,
business ownership provides more security, more safety, and markedly better
financial prospects. But the benefits are not limited to the entrepreneur and his
or her family; undocumented entrepreneurship has the potential to provide an

workers-wear-diapers-because-bosses-allow-no-breaks-ngo-says [https://perma.cc/WBB5-TZAD]
(noting that a particular chicken plant "smells like a combination of chicken blood and bleach"); see
also Grabell, supra note 181.
183 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 785; see also Grabell, supra note 181 (noting that some
workers tasked with rounding up chickens "are paid around $2.25 for every thousand chickens[, and
that t]wo crews of nine catchers can bring in about seventy-five thousand chickens a night," coming to
$168.75 an evening, presumably shared amongst nine workers).
184 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 785. Specifically,
the jobs available to most immigrants do not provide much hope of economic advancement, which might convince immigrant workers to consider entrepreneurship. This is
known as the blocked mobility theory, and studies show that "barriers in traditional labor
markets and low human capital acquisition tend to be the driving forces behind the growth
of self-employment activity among Latinos, especially the foreign-born."
Id. (quoting Barbara J. Robles & Hector Cordero-Guzmin, Latino Self Employment and Entrepreneurship in the United States: An Overview of the Literature and Data Sources, 613 ANNALS. AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18, 21 (2007)).
185 Stephanie A. Bohon et al., Mexican Self-Employment in Old and New Latino Places, in
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS & LOCAL RECEPTIONS: NEW LATINO IMMIGRATION TO THE SOUTHEASTERN
UNITED STATES, supra note 145, at 199, 200.
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economic boon throughout the national economy. 186 Immigrant participation in
the workplace serves to bolster sorely needed revenue for the federal government, 187 including tens of billions of dollars for the Social Security trust
fund. 188 Additionally, there is significant evidence that immigrant participation
in the workplace helps on a local scale, with one report estimating that undocumented immigrants pay $11.64 billion a year towards state and local taxes. 189
This influx of revenue is particularly vital for small towns, where immigrantowned businesses have helped revitalize otherwise abandoned strip malls and
commercial districts throughout the United States. 190 Helping the economies of
small towns not only keeps money circulating within the community, but it
also provides local government with additional revenues through sales taxes,
payroll taxes, and property taxes. 191 In this manner, immigrant entrepreneurship helps improve both the lives of the individual business owners, as well as
the local, state, and national economies.
B. Business Forms

It is difficult to ascertain the preferred legal entity for undocumented entrepreneurs. As private entities, states impose limited disclosure requirements, and
tax information is not public. We might, however, make some educated assumptions about the preferred business entity choice of undocumented entrepreneurs.
For example, it is likely that many undocumented entrepreneurs, like most entrepreneurs, decide against a formal legal entity and simply operate their busi186 Id.

187 See Alexia Fernindez Campbell,

Trump Says UndocumentedImmigrantsAre an Economic Bur-

den. They Pay Billions in Taxes., VOx (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/13/17229018/
undocumented-immigrants-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/Y4N-R5CS]. Campbell writes:
The most recent IRS data, from 2015, shows that the agency received 4.4 million income tax returns from workers who don't have Social Security numbers, which includes a large number of undocumented immigrants. That year, they paid $23.6 billion
in income taxes. That doesn't even include workers who paid taxes with fake Social
Security numbers on their W-2 forms, which is also common.

Id.

188 See id. (quoting Stephen Goss, chief actuary of the Social Security Administration, who said,
"[w]e estimate that earnings by unauthorized immigrants result in a net positive effect on Social Security financial status generally"); see also Krishna, supra note 7, at 210 (stating that "[t]he Social Security Administration reported in 2013 that undocumented immigrants worked and contributed as much
as thirteen billion dollars in payroll taxes (including employers' contributions) to the Social Security
trust fund in 2010").
189 LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS' STATE & LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS 1-2 (2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/
immigration2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J53L-YP99].
190 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 774-75.
191 Id.
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nesses as sole proprietorships. 192 This is because sole proprietorships demand
few legal formalities, have no filing requirements for formation, and are often
the least expensive option for entrepreneurs. 193 Further, given that many undocumented immigrants may lack access to legal advice, they are likely to start operating their business without legal formalities, which would normally result in
the operation being treated as a sole proprietorship. 194 But if an undocumented
entrepreneur were to receive legal advice, it is unlikely that the business would
remain a sole proprietorship. This is because any business that carries a modicum of potential liability would lead a rational entrepreneur to regard the liability protections of most legal entity forms with favor. 195 Due to restrictions
against employment of undocumented people, discussed in more detail below,
many undocumented entrepreneurs opt to form either a cooperative or an LLC.
1. Worker Cooperatives
A worker cooperative is an ancient legal entity 196 that has grown in favor
of late.'197 In short, worker cooperatives are "firms that are democratically
owned and managed by their workers." 198 As succinctly described by one
scholar, "a worker cooperative adheres to fundamental principles, such as voluntary and nondiscriminatory membership, democratic member control, equitable economic participation by members, and a commitment to ongoing
member education." 1 99 These appealing characteristics have made worker cooperatives the entity of choice for many activists agitating to increase local
ownership and control of businesses.

192 See Choose a Business Structure, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/businessguide/launch-your-business/choose-business-structure [https://perma.cc/Y83U-EP4H] ("Sole proprietorships can be a good choice for low-risk businesses and owners who want to test their business idea
before forming a more formal business.").
193 Michael F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs:A Limited Liability Sole Pro-

prietorshipAct (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 381, 387.
194 See generally JusticeIndex 2016, NAT'L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., https://justiceindex.org/
[https://perma.cc/4476-MB2E] (providing data and information online regarding access to justice
programs available throughout the country).
195 See Crusto, supra note 193, at 383 ("Shielding a shareholder's personal assets from business
liability is a quintessential element of corporate law.").
196 See Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin, Work in America and the Cooperative Movement, in
WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 3, 3 (Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin eds., 1984) ("Since
colonial times there has been a continuous history of worker cooperatives in the United States.").
19? Eillie Anzilotti, More U.S. BusinessesAre Becoming Worker Co-ops: Here's Why, FAST COMPANY (May 21, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40572926/more-u-s-businesses-are-becomingworker-co-ops-heres-why [https://perma.cc/K9EZ-X95V].
198 Jackall & Levin, supra note 196, at 3.
199 See Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperativesas a Job CreationStrategyfor Low-Income

Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 185-86 (1999).
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Worker cooperatives have also proven to be quite popular for undocumented entrepreneurs. 20 0 This is likely due to the fact that the worker cooperative entity boasts a number of inherent advantages that might be appealing to
an undocumented worker. First of all, worker cooperatives provide democratic
control over a workplace. Like many workers, undocumented workers are likely to be attracted to this governance structure. Indeed, undocumented workers
might know more intimately the advantages of worker control, given that
many of them were exploited by previous employers. 20 1 A democratically controlled business is also attractive for workers of all stripes, as lay-offs or cuts in
wages are often driven by investors or management interested in increasing
profit margins. Worker cooperatives are less likely to experience such lay-offs
or cuts in wages because there are no outside investors and management is
conducted by the workers themselves. 20 2 Thus, after covering the cost of operations and salaries, there is little concern for how much profit a particular
endeavor makes. A worker cooperative additionally provides the potential upside of business ownership to laborers who have traditionally not been given
such an opportunity. 203 Further, because the workers are also tasked with running the business, there is an invaluable education component of being a member of a worker cooperative. 20 4 Workers are often forced to learn "businessrelated skills such as accounting, marketing, management, and literacy," which
are not often provided to laborers. 205 Finally, a worker cooperative might also
protect formerly vulnerable workers from exploitation by providing greater
negotiating power. If a dishonest person owes money to an individual undoc200

See Krishna, supra note 7, at 216 ("[Democracy at Work Institute's] mission is to 'expand the
worker cooperative model to reach communities most directly affected by social and economic inequality, specifically people of color, recent immigrants, and low-wage workforces. "'); see also Cummings, supra note 199, at 191-92 (discussing Las Domesticas, a cooperative of domestic workers);
Mastman, supra note 128, at 241 (discussing the CleanHome cooperative).
201 See Cummings, supra note 199, at 187 ("Workers exercise final decision-making authority
over the way the work is organized, performed, and managed. They are given a stake in the business,
and must work collaboratively in order to achieve success.").
202 Id. Cummings further notes:
The formation of a cooperative business can also increase job security for workers who
would otherwise be subject to market exploitation based on their vulnerable economic
position. The collective nature of the cooperative enterprise provides mechanisms that
foster this security. For example, the workers can provide each other mutual support in
finding and maintaining stable jobs for all cooperative members.

Id.
203

2 04

Id.

Id.

See id. ("By bearing the responsibility of running a business, the workers commit themselves
to a continuing process of self-education .... In fact, many cooperatives are formed primarily to facilitate job training, and seek to attract seed money from foundations and government agencies to promote this mission.").
205
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umented person, they may threaten to report the person to immigration authorities as a way to avoid payment. This danger is lessoned in a worker cooperative, because the debtor "may be less inclined to withhold payment from a
business entity with the power to resort to legal action to enforce its rights." 206
An example of a successful and much celebrated worker cooperative is Si
Se Puede, a Brooklyn-based company that provides cleaning services. 207
Formed in 2006, Si Se Puedeis a women-owned worker cooperative where all
members are immigrants. 208 The organization is "designed to create living
wage jobs that will be done in a safe and healthy environment." 20 9 One member of Si Se Puede reported that after joining the cooperative, her hourly rate
rose from $6.25 an hour to $25 an hour. 2 10
206

See id. (discussing "the formality of the cooperative business"). In addition, although beyond
the scope of this Article, cooperatives present the opportunity to take advantage of certain preferential
tax treatment. Briefly, cooperatives may deduct patronage dividends (amounts distributed to cooperative members on the basis of their work with the cooperative). See I.R.C. subtitle A, chapter 1, subchapter T (2018) (discussing the tax treatment of cooperatives and their patrons).
207 About Us, SI SE PUEDE! WOMEN'S COOPERATIVE, https://wecandoit.coop/about/ [https://

perma.cc/8A5Y-VKNU].
208 Id.

209 See id. (describing the organization as designed "to provide social support and educational
opportunities for our members").
210 Laura Flanders, How America's Largest Worker Owned Co-Op Lifts People Out of Poverty,
YES! MAG. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/poverty/2014/08/15/how-america-slargest-worker-owned-co-op-lifts-people-out-of-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/HR5H-6A6k]. For a $40
monthly dues payment, workers receive 100% of the cleaning fees. Although the positives of worker
cooperatives are numerous and the popularity of cooperatives is growing, there are some potential
negative aspects of worker cooperatives as well. One can easily imagine how the democratic governance structure of worker cooperatives, although empowering for individual workers, might prove to be
inefficient and challenging. See Cummings, supra note 199, at 188 ("A cooperative's democratic
decision-making structure, while promoting collective action, may hamstring effective business management by hindering the cooperative's ability to respond swiftly to market opportunities. . .. [T]here
is a potential for intra-organizational disputes[,] . . . requir[ing] a greater investment of resources to
mediate member conflict, which also could reduce economic efficiency."); see also Alana Semuels,
Getting Rid ofBosses, THE ATLANTIC (July 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/07/no-bosses-worker-owned-cooperatives/397007/ [https://perma.cc/T8ZZ-EMDD] (describing
Black Star Co-op, a worker cooperative in Austin, Texas) ("[The Co-op] has been trying for some
time to build a cover on its patio . . .. At some businesses, a $30,000 patio cover might be able to be
approved by a CEO and built within months. At Black Star, it has taken years. There were detailed
purchase proposals and meetings, and the vote had to be unanimous among the 20-member worker
assembly."). Additionally, worker cooperatives organized with the help of service providers may find it
difficult to sustain success once the support structure is removed. Finally, if a worker cooperative is dedicated to supporting an educational mission, there is a potential burden of training less-skilled members
and an organization must practice patience with such members. See generally Cummings, supra note
199, at 187-88 (highlighting some of the challenges (as well as benefits) that may accompany a cooperative business structure). Discussing the pros and cons of cooperatives, Cummings notes that:
A significant drawback of the cooperative form is the potential for conflict between its
job training and job creation missions. In particular, lower-skilled, less efficient workers-while gaining skills through their participation in the cooperative-are often una-
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2. Limited Liability Companies
Unlike the worker cooperative, which claims a heritage that predates the
founding of the country, 21 1 the LLC is a relatively new legal entity. It was invented in 1977 in Wyoming by a group of accountants and lawyers seeking to
create an entity that incorporated the most attractive aspects of partnerships
(e.g., pass-through taxation and flexible governance)2 12 and corporations (e.g.,
the limited liability protections).2 13 Once the tax treatment of this new form
was clarified by the Internal Revenue Service in 1997, the LLC quickly became the most popular legal entity for new businesses.214 Of the numerous advantages of the LLC, it appears that flexibility is its primary attraction. Although the pass-through treatment is certainly an advantage, similar treatment
is available to owners of S-Corps.2 15 An S-Corp, however, may not have more
than one hundred shareholders, more than one class of stock, shareholders other than natural persons (or certain permitted entities), 216 or any non-resident
alien shareholders.217 In contrast, an LLC may enjoy the pass-through taxation
of a partnership without any such ownership restrictions. 218 Further, this flexibility extends to many aspects of the LLC, including the manner in which an
organization is governed 219 and the way members of the LLC are paid.220 Givble to generate their share of business clients or participate on an equal footing with
other members of the group. This can create resentment in the higher-skilled members,
causing intra-group conflict. If low-skilled members continue to act as a drain on cooperative resources, they may jeopardize the economic viability of the group, and, in serious cases, precipitate the dissolution of the business.

Id. at 188.
211 Jackall & Levin, supra note 196,
at 3.
212 Eric H. Franklin, A RationalApproach to Business Entity Choice,
64 U. KAN. L. REV. 573,
586 (2016).
213 See Daniel M. Hausermann, For a Few DollarsLess: Explaining State to State Variation
in
Limited LiabilityCompany Popularity,20 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2011) (noting that the LLC
was "designed to be popular" for entrepreneurs).
214 Franklin, supra note 212, at 586.
215 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018). If an owner of a corporation were interested in the pass-through
taxation enjoyed by partnerships, they might opt to be treated as a "small business corporation" by
making an S-election. See id.
216 Certain trusts and tax-exempt organizations are permitted to be shareholders. See id.

§ 1361(c)(6).
217 Id. § 1361(b).
218

Id.

21 An LLC can, for example, opt to be managed by its members, an individual member, or an
outside manager. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 156C, § 24(a) (2020). The statute states:
Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, the management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members. An operating agreement may provide for the
management, in whole or in part, of a limited liability company by one or more managers,
who shall hold office and have the duties set forth in the operating agreement.
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en the popularity of LLCs among entrepreneurs and the fact that pass-through
taxation is available regardless of immigration status, it should be no surprise
that many undocumented entrepreneurs are also attracted to the LLC form.221
Although there is no comprehensive study of undocumented immigrants who
have formed LLCs, there are reports of immigrants operating graphic design
businesses and political consultancies as LLCs.22 2 Indeed, the practice has become commonplace enough to support a private industry for helping undocumented immigrants form LLCs.223
III. ENTREPRENEURSHIP OR ILLEGALLY EMPLOYING ONESELF?

Increasing numbers of undocumented entrepreneurs forming businesses
as worker cooperatives and LLCs have led to increased financial stability and
more pleasant employment for undocumented people. The story of undocumented business ownership, however, is not as simple as the previous Section
suggests, and there is a significant question as to the legality of an undocumented person owning a business. Or more precisely, given that the federal law
prohibits the employment of undocumented people, an undocumented owner
of a business might be violating federal law if the owner is deemed to be an
employee of the business.224 As absurd as it sounds, an owner of a business
would be guilty of employing an undocumented immigrant because the owner
is employing him- or herself. Thus, the distinction between employment and
ownership is of vital importance.
Id.

22 0

An LLC may give preference to individual members or classes of members in terms of distributions. Id. § 29(a) ("The profits and losses of a limited liability company shall be allocated among
the members, and among classes or groups of members, in the manner provided in the operating
agreement.").
221 See Carcamo, supra note 5 ("It's unclear how many entrepreneurs [form LLCs]. Immigration
experts say anecdotal evidence suggests interest in such businesses has grown in recent years as more
states have adopted tougher illegal-immigration laws. But research is scant.").
222
Id. Anecdotally, this Article's author has helped two undocumented immigrants open political
consulting businesses to help politicians reach out to Latino voters.
223 See, e.g., Robert Acevedo, Can an Illegal Immigrant Open an LLC Business?, FREEDOMTAX
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.itinnumberonline.com/can-an-illegal-immigrant-open-an-llcbusinesse/ [https://perma.cc/63V8-WPM4]. The extraordinary flexibility of LLCs has resulted in an
additional, and certainly unintended, consequence: LLCs may be structured to look very similar to
cooperatives. See id. Because an organizer of an LLC has a virtually unfettered ability to dictate the
structure of an LLC, there is nothing to stop an organizer from adopting the cooperative practice of,
for example, democratic governance or equal economic treatment of members. See Cummings, supra
note 199, at 205 ("The governing legal document of an LLC, the operating agreement, can be easily
adapted to include cooperative principles.").
224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2018) ("It is unlawful for a person or other entity . .
to hire, or to
recruit ... for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized
alien .... ").
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Section A of this Part reviews the legislative history of denying undocumented immigrants the right to work in the United States. 225 Section B of this
Part discusses when an undocumented immigrant business owner is also an
employee in violation of the IRCA. 226
A. The Legislative History of the Employment Restriction

The prohibition on employing undocumented immigrants, although widely known, is a fairly recent restriction. As pointed out by one professor, "[f]or a
century before 1986, federal law permitted employers to hire undocumented
immigrants." 227 The legislative history of immigration statutes illustrates how
modern immigration law evolved to focus on the activities of employers. 228 In
contrast, early statutes criminalized those who were luring immigrants into the
country with the promise of employment. For example, the Immigration Act of
1917 made it unlawful to "induce, assist, encourage, or solicit ... any alien to
come into the United States by promise of employment through advertisements." 229 It is notable that this statute focused on the unlawful entry of immigrants, and did not specifically address employment of undocumented immigrants who might already reside in the United States. 230 Following this theme,
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (the "1952 Act") established fines
and imprisonment for anyone found guilty of "willfully or knowingly encourag[ing] or induc[ing], or attempt[ing] to encourage or induce, either directly or
indirectly, the entry into the United States" of undocumented people.2 3 1 The
1952 Act also focused on the entry of undocumented immigrants, but farm
owners expressed concerns that the "encourages or induces" language would
cover agricultural hiring. Although the 1952 Act did not explicitly prohibit the
employment of undocumented people that already resided in the United States,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that paying someone for work might constitute unlawful encouragement or inducement. Recognizing the potential economic devastation that would befall the agricultural industry if employers were
unable to take advantage of inexpensive undocumented labor, a group of Texas

225 See infra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
226

See infra notes 245-293 and accompanying text.

22, Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibitingthe Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experi-

ment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193.
228 See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 879-80
(1917).
229 Id.
20 This may have been due to the fact that early twentieth century migration patterns for farmworkers involved returning to Mexico at the end of each harvesting season. See supra notes 145-157
and accompanying text.
231

Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414,

§ 274,

66 Stat. 163, 228 (1952).
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legislators "muscled something called the 'Texas Proviso' into law." 23 2 The
Texas Proviso made it clear that employment of undocumented people did not
constitute encouragement or inducement and therefore was not prohibited by
the 1952 Act. The practical result was that employers of undocumented people
were told: "Forget the law. You'll still get your cheap labor." 233
Needless to say, the 1952 Act did not quell concerns over unlawful immigration. Because the Texas Proviso was focused on protecting employers, the
primary motivation for undocumented immigrants to enter the United States
(i.e., jobs) remained in place. Thus, undocumented immigrants continued to
cross into the United States to work, and policymakers concluded that any
statute that ignored the employers would not be effective in curbing immigration. In this spirit, a few decades after the 1952 Act, the 92nd Congress produced a series of bills that specifically criminalized the employment of undocumented immigrants.2 34 In its report, the House Judiciary Committee stated:
[T]he primary reason for the illegal alien problem is the economic
imbalance between the United States and the countries from which
aliens come, coupled with the chance of employment in the United
States. Consequently, it is apparent that this problem cannot be
solved as long as jobs can be obtained by those who enter this country illegally .... 23
Following this logic, the House of Representatives passed several bills to penalize the employment of undocumented immigrants. Despite efforts during
the Nixon and Ford administrations, none of these bills were able to pass in the
Senate.236 Undaunted by the failures of his predecessors, President Carter also
proposed restrictions on the employment of undocumented people.237 His efforts also failed. 238 These repeated failures left the 1952 Act and the Texas
Proviso intact for over three decades, imposing no consequences on employers
who hired undocumented people.
This hypocrisy was finally put to rest in 1986 with the passage of IRCA,
which addressed the primary shortcoming of previous laws by specifically
prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring undocumented workers.239 Vio-

232

FreedomDay, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1986), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/

1986/10/19/138286.html?pageNumber=231 [https://perma.cc/8R6D-LGJW].
233 Id.

234 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 57 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661.
235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Id. at 53.
Id.
8 U.S.C.

238

23

§ 1324a(a)(1).
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lations of this prohibition would result in fines, asset forfeiture, and even arrests of employers. 240
Although the passage of IRCA addressed the hypocrisy of the Texas Proviso, it presented undocumented workers with a difficult choice: if the only
way to provide food and shelter for your family is to secure work in the United
States, you can either (i) forge or purchase fake documentation, 24 1 or (ii) accept
a job with an unscrupulous employer willing to violate IRCA. 24 2 Such employers were often motivated to hire undocumented immigrants under the assumption that undocumented workers are unlikely to defend their rights in court. 243
As noted above, some entrepreneurial undocumented immigrants have rejected
these choices and opted to start their own business. Yet, under certain circumstances, IRCA's prohibition against employment of undocumented people
might reach undocumented business owners, as the law sometimes considers
business owners to be employees. 244 Thus, even as a business owner, an undocumented entrepreneur might violate IRCA.
B. When Is a Business Owner an Employee?

Because IRCA was specifically drafted to target the employment of undocumented immigrants, it is not surprising that it does not address business
ownership by undocumented immigrants.245 The relevant language of IRCA
makes it "unlawful for a person or other entity . .. to hire, or to recruit or refer
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien." 246 The statute does not address business ownership and
defines neither "hire" nor "employment." 247 This silence is not the final word,

240

Id.
See CHAC6N & DAVIS, supra note 35, at 165 ("According to the New York Times, since the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 set penalties for employers who knowingly hire undocumented immigrants, most have been forced to buy fake Social Security cards to obtain work.").
242 Travis Putnam Hill, Big EmployersNo Strangers to Benefits of Cheap, IllegalLabor, TEX. TRIB.
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/12/19/big-name-businesses-exploit-immigrant-labor/
241

[https://perma.cc/RY7G-4ZKE].
243 See id. ("Employment rights apply equally to all workers, regardless of their immigration
status .... The problem is most undocumented workers don't know that, and employers may not
know that. If they do know that, they will nevertheless use those workers' vulnerable immigration
status to discourage them from enforcing their rights." (quoting Bill Beardall, executive director of the
Equal Justice Center)).
2 44
See, e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.

829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities Act,

Pub. L. No. 101-335, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.).
245 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
246 Id.
247 See id. (providing definitions for other terms in the statute such as "unauthorized alien").
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however, because courts have construed a number of statutes in a manner that
treats an owner of a business as an employee of the business.
This question-precisely who is an "employee"-is one that "has challenged scholars, jurists, and practitioners since the dawn of labor law." 248 As
with most legal puzzles, this issue's genesis lies in imprecise drafting as many
statutes fail to provide adequate definitions. Further complicating matters is the
fact that a litany of benefits and protections-including, for example, minimum wage laws, antidiscrimination protections, and Social Security retirement
benefits-hinges on the existence of an employment relationship. 249 With such
high stakes, it is no wonder that this question is often intensely litigated.
1. The Common Law Test

Although intuition might suggest that an owner of a business cannot simultaneously be deemed an employee, this is a relatively common conclusion
for many courts. For example, in Clackamas GastroenterologyAssociates v.
Wells, the Supreme Court held in 2003 that the owners of a medical practice
may be treated as employees when determining whether the business was covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 250 The ADA only applies
to entities with fifteen or more employees and it is common for doctors in
medical practices to be partners in the entity, as opposed to employees.25 1 The
question before the Clackamas Court was whether a medical partnership with
more than fifteen doctors (i.e., owners of a partnership) is subject to the
248
249

Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers,22 LEWIS &CLARK L. REV. 105, 106 (2018).
Id. at 115-16. Sunshine states:

Employment status determines whether a worker is entitled to the minimum wage and
overtime under federal and state law. Employment status also determines whether a
worker is covered under federal labor legislation, such as the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) and its attendant rights to collective bargaining and protection fromretaliation for concerted action. Only employees are protected by Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions. In addition, only employees are entitled to unemployment, worker's
compensation, or Social Security retirement benefits. Although employers are generally
not required to provide retirement benefits, if they do, these benefits are governed by
the federal Employee Retirement and Insurance Security Act (ERISA), which applies
only where an employer/employee relationship exists. The Affordable Care Act's employer health insurance requirements apply only to employees. In addition to labor and
employment law, employment status matters for myriad substantive areas, such as tax,
intellectual property, torts, and criminal law.
Id. (citations omitted).
250 See 538 U.S. 440, 448, 450-52 (2003) (holding that courts should refer to the common law
control test to determine if an owner should be considered an employee).
251

See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§

12101, 12111(2018) (defining employer to

mean "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each

working day").
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ADA.252 Interestingly, unlike IRCA, the ADA actually defined "employee,"
albeit in a maddeningly recursive manner.25 3 Under the ADA, an "employee" is
"an individual employed by an employer." 254 Given this lack of statutory guidance, the Clackamas Court turned to the common law. 255
The Clackamas Court's resort to common law has precedent, as courts
have a tradition of turning to common law in the absence of a clear statutory
definition of "employee." 256 Clackamas cited the relative primacy of common
law, noting that no particular entity form, internal agreement, or individual title
shall sway the determination.257 The core of the common law control test is set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which defines the relationship
between master and servant.258 Under the Restatement, a servant (i.e., an employee) is "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control." 25 9 The Restatement further
clarifies this definition by providing a list of ten non-exhaustive factors to
weigh. 260 These ten factors, however, do not always control the outcome. 26 1
252 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444-47.
253

See 42 U.S.C.

§§

12101, 12111.

254

Id. §§ 12101, 12111(4). The ClackamasCourt bemoaned that this definition is "completely
circular and explains nothing." 538 U.S. at 444 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 323 (1992)). In Darden, the Court faced a similar failure of the Employment Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 to define "employee." See 503 U.S. at 319-20.
255 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444-47; Mastman, supra note 128, at 243 ("Confronting a question not fully answered by the statute or regulations, [the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing
Officer (OCAHO)] turned to federal common law for guidance. . .. OCAHO's willingness to use
employment law to define an edge of the employment relationship may make it more willing to do so
in the future.").

256 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444-47; Darden, 503 U.S. 322-23 ("In the past, when Congress
has used the term 'employee' without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.")
(citations omitted).
257 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450 ("The mere fact that a person has a particular title-such as
partner, director, or vice president-should not necessarily be used to determine whether he or she is
an employee or a proprietor. . . . Nor should the mere existence of a document styled 'employment
agreement' lead inexorably to the conclusion that either party is an employee."); see also Stephanie
Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Who Counts?: The United States Supreme Court Cites "Control" as the Key to DistinguishingEmployersfrom Employees Under FederalEmployment AntidiscriminationLaws, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 761, 780 (stating that the Clackamas"decision makes
it clear that neither the form of business organization nor an individual's title determines coverage
under the statutes").
258 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
259 Id. § 220(1).
260 Id. § 220(2). The definition provides that the ten factors to be considered are as follows:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details
of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
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Indeed, the Clackamas Court identified a six-factor common law test to determine if a particular individual is an employee, and one could argue that the
Clackamasdecision reduced the common law test to a single factor: control. 262
As Justice Ginsburg's dissent noted, the Clackamas majority opinion identifies
"one of the common-law indicia of a master-servant relationship-control over
the work of others engaged in the business of the enterprise-and accords that
factor overriding significance." 263 Thus, Clackamas set precedent in turning to
common law and in focusing on control in determining whether a business
owner is an employee. 264
2. Applying the Common Law Test to LLCs and Worker Cooperatives
In light of Clackamas, to determine if IRCA applies to an undocumented
business owner, a court will use the common law control test and examine
whether the undocumented immigrant owner has significant control. With sufficient evidence of control, the immigrant owner will not be deemed an emusually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d)
the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment,
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

Id.
261 See Sunshine, supra note 248, at 118 ("In practice, the common law test takes slightly different formulations across jurisdictions and agencies.").
262 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-50 (describing the "six factors ... relevant to the inquiry
whether a shareholder-director is an employee"); see also Mastman, supra note 128, at 249 ("The
ultimate question under Clackamasis 'whether the individual acts independently and participates in
managing the organization, or whether the individual is subject to the organization's control."').
263 Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 452 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the Restatement of Employment Law provides some clarity on how ownership affects employment status by asserting that
"[a]n individual who renders services to an enterprise that the individual controls through ownership
is not as a general matter treated as an employee of that enterprise for purposes of the laws providing
protections or benefits to or imposing obligations on employees." RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 1.03 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Complicating matters, some statutes (e.g., the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.

§§

201-219 (2018)) specifically eschew the common law test and

instead impose the "economic realities" test. See Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436,
1440 (10th Cir. 2013). The economic realities test, used primarily to determine if a particular worker
should be categorized as an independent contractor or an employee, consists of six factors, only one of
which focuses on the common law control determination. The economic realities test consists of the
following six factors: (i) the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer's
business; (ii) whether the worker's opportunity for profit or loss depends on the worker's managerial
skill; (iii) the extent of the relative investments of the employer and the worker; (iv) whether the work
performed requires special skills and initiative; (v) the permanency of the relationship; and (vi) the
degree of control exercised or retained by the employer. Id.
2"

See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-50.
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ployee. In Clackamas, for example, the Court noted that the owners of the
medical practice were not employees because they "control the operation of
their clinic, they share the profits, and they are personally liable for malpractice claims." 265 Consider, however, the absurdity of trying to deduce if the
owner of a single-member LLC is also an employee. In effect, one is forced to
ask if an owner manifests sufficient control over him- or herself such that the
law might justifiably consider the owner an employee.
Absurdity aside, the question for LLCs turns on whether the LLC is a
member-managed or a manager-managed entity. In short, an LLC may be
managed either by its members or by a manager (or managers), who may or
may not be members.266 In a member-managed LLC, the "owners are engaged
in the daily operation of the business" and "[e]ach member has the apparent
authority to bind the LLC in transactions in the ordinary course of business." 267
This is in contrast to a manager-managed LLC, where the "operation of the
entity is handled by a 'manager,"' and "[m]embers (who are not also managers) of a manager-managed LLC do not have the apparent authority to bind the
LLC." 268 Thus, if an LLC is member-managed, the member (i.e., the owner)
has control over the operations of the entity. 269
Although no court has directly ruled on the question of whether an undocumented owner of a business should be treated as an employee for the purposes of IRCA's Employment Restriction, there is some guidance by analogy.
For example, with respect to tax treatment, the law has consistently held that
owners of LLCs taxed as partnerships are not considered employees. 270 Further, if a court were to apply the common law control test to an LLC owned
and managed by an undocumented immigrant, there is a strong likelihood that
an owner of a properly formed LLC will not be deemed an employee. One
scholar argues:

265
266

Id. at 451.
See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
EmergingEntity,

47 BuS. LAW. 375, 385 (1992) ("Most of the LLC statutes provide for management directly by the
members, although the statutes permit the parties to provide, by agreement, for centralized management."); see also MICHAEL A. CHASALow, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 245 (1st ed.

2013).
267

CHASALOW, supra note 266, at 245.

268 Id.

269 Likewise, if an undocumented immigrant formed a manager-managed LLC, the requisite level
of control may not be evident. For example, if a non-owner is appointed as the manager, the LLC
owner would be under the control of the manager and would appear to lack the requisite level of control (i.e., the owner would likely be deemed an employee).
270 See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1959) ("A partnership is not an employer of the partners. It makes a return but the individual partners in their own personal returns account for their distributive shares of net income and net loss.").
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[R]ulings from courts interpreting other federal employment laws
suggest that so long as members of an LLC have a "proprietary"interest in the business-as demonstrated by their degree of ownership, their control over management decisions, and the extent to
which their compensation is contingent on the business's profitsthey should not be considered "employees" of the LLC. 271
Rulings in cases assessing employment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 272 Title VII, 273 and the Fair Employment and Housing Act are
consistent with this assertion. 274 Similarly, and in line with the Clackamas decision, in cases where an individual shows ownership, engages in governance,
and receives profits based upon percentage ownership, the individual is not
considered an employee. 275 Under this analysis, it seems safe to assume that an
LLC owner is not considered an employee so long as the owner has managerial
control over the LLC's activities, a proprietary interest in the LLC's business,
and compensation that is dependent upon the profits of the LLC.
Unfortunately, the answer as to whether a member of a worker cooperative is justifiably considered an employee is not as clear. If the common law
control test is applied, the fact that worker cooperatives are owner-operated
(i.e., owners have total control) strongly suggests an argument in favor of not
treating worker cooperative members as employees. Indeed, a commonsense
analysis of the structure of worker cooperatives suggests this conclusion. In
this vein, some argue that because worker cooperative owners enjoy "equal
control, the worker-owners do not have an employment relationship vis-a-vis
the cooperative, and thus do not require work authorization."276 Other commentators are less convinced, 277 highlighting a handful of cases that have treat-

271 Cummings, supra note 199, at 208.

Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1399 (11th Cir. 1991).
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 984-85 (1st Cir. 1997); Equal Emp't Opportunities
Comm'n v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1984).
274 Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 863 (9th
Cir. 1996).
272
273

275 Cummings, supra note 199, at 208 n.119.
276 See Krishna, supra note 7, at 217 ("Worker cooperatives, businesses owned by the workers
themselves, have taken root as a means of job opportunity for immigrant workers, including for those
without work authorization status." (citing CMTY. ENTER. PROJECT OF THE HARVARD TRANSACTIONAL LAW CLINICS & IMMIGRANT WORKER CTR. COLLABORATIVE, A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF
BUSINESS OWNERSHIP FOR IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS IN MASSACHUSETTS (2015), http://clinics.
law.harvard.edu/tlc/files/2015/09/TLC-Immigrant-Entrepreneurs-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/

R2BA-D76S])).
277 See Cummings, supra note 199, at 203 ("[I]t is not clear whether members who work on behalf of the cooperative and receive patronage refunds would be considered employees under immigration laws."). It is further noted that "areview of the few cases that address the applicability of federal
employment laws to cooperative corporation members tends to support the conclusion that members
would be considered employees subject to IRCA." Id. at 203 n.104.
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ed members of worker cooperatives as employees under the Federal Labor
Standards Act, 278 state unemployment law, 2 79 and a state's workers' compensation law.280 For these reasons, it is fair to say that the matter is unsettled.
3. Seeking Answers in Legislative History
The legislative history of IRCA clarifies that the Act was never intended
to punish undocumented owners of businesses. IRCA's employer sanctions
were passed to target employers who enticed immigrants to come to, or stay in,
the United States and sought "to close the back door on illegal immigration so
that the front door on legal immigration may remain open. The principal means
of closing the back door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is through
employer sanctions." 281 The primary motivation for the law was the belief that
undocumented workers were competing with U.S. citizens for jobs. 282 At the
time of IRCA's consideration, the unemployment rate in the United States was
seven percent, and the legislative history notes that unemployment "is much
higher among the minority groups with whom undocumented workers compete
for jobs most directly." 283 The hope was that IRCA's employer sanctions would
result in "ending the magnet that lures [undocumented workers] to this country." 284 Beyond legislative intent, the Department of Justice's comments to the
final rulemaking procedures of IRCA also emphasized that the focus of these
prohibitions was to target "those persons and entities that hire, or recruit or
refer for a fee" undocumented immigrants. 285 These proclamations make it
clear that IRCA's intended target was not the immigrant population, but the
entities that hired immigrants. 286 Thus, the legislative history strongly suggests

278

See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (holding that homework-

er cooperative members were considered employees under the FLSA).
279 Builders Commonwealth, Inc. v. Dep't of Emp't & Econ. Dev., 814N.W.2d 49, 52-54 (Minn.
Ct. App.
2012).
2 80
See Emp't Div. v. Surata Soy Foods, Inc., 662 P.2d 810, 811-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding

that coop members are employees under Oregon's workers' compensation law).
281

H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650.

282 See id. at 47 ("Undocumented aliens tend to come from countries with high population growth
and few employment opportunities. The United States is not in a position to redress this imbalance by
absorbing these workers into our economy and our population.").
283 Id.
284
Id. at 45-46. Interestingly, of particular concern was the effect immigration had on black unemployment. See id. at 47. A representative of the NAACP argued that "[m]any blacks are forced
from employment rolls by the undocumented worker who is hired at a subminimum wage.. . . The
worker is consciously aware that he/she has no protection . . and will accept 'starvation' wages to be
employed in the United States." Id.
285 Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16216-01 (May 1, 1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R.

pt. 109, 274a).
286 See id.
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that IRCA's employer sanctions were adopted to address employers taking advantage of the perceived willingness of the undocumented workforce to accept
low wages, thereby exacerbating unemployment of U.S. citizens.287 There is no
suggestion that the employer sanctions were adopted to curtail entrepreneurship. To be blunt, an undocumented immigrant who starts a business to be selfemployed has not stolen a job from a U.S. citizen. Because IRCA's Employment Restriction was specifically designed to disincentivize employers from
hiring undocumented immigrants, it would strain legislative intent to stretch its
language to punish undocumented entrepreneurs under the technicality that the
owner might also be considered an employee.
4. The Ultimate Effect on Entrepreneurs and Their Lawyers
At this point, it might be prudent to note that an undocumented person on
the radar of immigration enforcement agencies would view this as a ridiculously theoretical discussion. To state the obvious, a violation of IRCA's Employment Restriction is likely to be quite low on the list of concerns for an undocumented entrepreneur. If immigration authorities were targeting a particular
undocumented entrepreneur for deportation or removal, they would not have to
rely upon a violation of IRCA's Employment Restriction. Rather, the immigration authorities could simply institute deportation proceedings on the basis that
the person lacks appropriate documentation to remain in the United States,
rendering moot any nuanced questions of employment versus ownership.
Despite the apparent picayune nature of this discussion, an undocumented
immigrant might be wise to abide by IRCA's Employment Restriction, no matter how technical or slight. This is because a history of unlawful behavior,
which could include IRCA violations, might be held against an undocumented
immigrant when he or she applies for some relief. 288 For example, in In re C-VT-, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that, among other factors,
"the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration
laws" would weigh against an application for cancellation of removal. 289 Thus,
to the extent an undocumented immigrant maintains hope of one day obtaining
legal status, it might be relevant to learn whether business ownership violates
IRCA because it might be considered an "additional significant violation." 290
Further, as an example of immigration law's many contradictory signals, an
287 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 57. The House Committee cautioned that IRCA's
employment sanctions were not intended to apply "in the case of casual hires," which they defined as
"those that do not involve the existence of an employer/employee relationship." Id. It is not entirely
clear what this means, but at least one court has interpreted this to refer to domestic workers. See id.
288 Mastman,
289

In

supra note 128, at 228 (citing In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998)).
re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11.

290 See Mastman, supra note 128, at 228-29.
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undocumented immigrant might find that business ownership is beneficial in
any future immigration procedure. At least one BIA decision seemed to hold a
quite favorable view of an applicant's entrepreneurship. 291
Mixed signals aside, the fact remains that any technical violation of IRCA's Employment Restriction is not likely to be a crucial question for many
undocumented people. Nonetheless, the lawfulness of any particular business
ownership might be relevant to the extent an undocumented immigrant consults a lawyer to help establish the business. If a lawyer were to help an undocumented immigrant navigate the bureaucratic odyssey of selecting an appropriate legal entity, the question of whether the undocumented immigrant
would be an owner (i.e., no violation of IRCA) or an employee (i.e., a violation of IRCA) is of vital interest to the attorney. As this Section makes clear,
the question is difficult to predict. Regardless, many lawyers form businesses
for undocumented people in an effort to help their clients escape brutal working conditions and achieve greater financial freedom.292 These lawyers are,
presumably, working under the assumption that the formation of LLCs and
worker cooperatives does not violate IRCA's Employment Restriction. This
conclusion is not outrageous, and given the unsettled state of the law surrounding the employment status of business owners, such lawyers can claim that
they are operating under a reasonable interpretation of the law.
The IRCA Employment Restriction, however, is not the only matter such
a lawyer ought to consider. As the discussion in Part I.B set forth, the Ninth
Circuit is of the opinion that the plain language of the Encouragement Restriction "criminalizes the simple words-spoken to a son, a wife, a parent, a
friend, a neighbor, a coworker, a student, a client-'I encourage you to stay
here."' 293 Thus, it is not outlandish to conclude that impermissible encouragement might include a lawyer's advice to (i) form an LLC or a worker cooperative, and (ii) structure the entity to avoid the possibility that the undocumented
owner might be considered an employee. After all, the goal of such advice is to
permit the undocumented person to secure safe, consistent, and humane employment, which would likely inform an undocumented person's decision to
reside in the United States. Indeed, framed in this manner, it is hard to comprehend how this type of legal advice would not constitute impermissible encouragement. As such, risk-averse lawyers might be chilled from engaging in this

291

See id. (noting that in In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002), "[t]he fact that the

respondent owned a business which supported her children was of great importance to the Board [of
Immigration Appeals], which emphasized that as a single mother, she was unlikely to find a comparably stable source of income in Mexico").
292 See Krishna, supra note 7, at 216-17 (describing an effort to promote business ownership
among undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs).
293

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2018).
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type of representation. This discouragement harms not only undocumented
immigrants, but also local, state, and federal economies.
IV. A PARADE OF NOT-SO-FANCIFUL HYPOTHETICALS

The Ninth Circuit's concern that the Encouragement Restriction might
reach intimate family conversations and political speech was enough to convince the court to find the provision unconstitutionally broad. By stopping
there, the Ninth Circuit did not conduct an exhaustive discussion of each socially beneficial activity that might be chilled by the Encouragement Provision.
It did not, for example, discuss how the Encouragement Restriction might convince a lawyer not to advise undocumented entrepreneurs. This Part will discuss additional activities that might be chilled by the Encouragement Provision. In the interest of heeding the Supreme Court's admonition not to indulge
in "fanciful hypotheticals," 294 this Part will only discuss activities in which
state governments, corporations, or people actively engage. These activities
include lawyers offering any advice to undocumented immigrants, let alone
advice regarding business ownership. They also include certain state laws and
policies, public educational institutions taking steps to attract a diverse student
body, and laws protecting the health and safety of workers.
A. CriminalizingLegal Advice
Perhaps the most upsetting consequence of the Encouragement Provision is
the potential to chill legal advice. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether a lawyer's "advice to clients" is protected by the
First Amendment. 295 Although the issue remains unsettled, there are a number
of compelling reasons to conclude that legal advice should be protected.296
294 See Brief forAmici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project & the National Immigration Project of

the National Lawyers Guild, supra note 12, at 10 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301
(2008) and bemoaning the "tendency of... overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream
of fanciful hypotheticals").
295 Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, IllegalCourses of Conduct,
"Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1283-84,

1343 (2005).
296 Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the FirstAmendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
639, 645 (2011). Professor Knake notes:
Given the important nature of attorney advice, it may come as a surprise to learn that
the First Amendment protection afforded to this category of speech is not clear. . . . Indeed, most First Amendment doctrine addresses speech intended for public consumption, while legal advice by definition entails communication intended for private consumption by clients, who then control its public dissemination. The Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on the matter.

Id.
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First of all, the very nature of a just and democratic government relies upon the
freedom of attorneys to provide unfettered advice to clients. 297 This is not hyperbole, given that "litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to
a minority to petition for redress of grievances." 298 One need not look further
than the Supreme Court's seminal cases of Brown v. Board of Education and
Obergefell v. Hodges to understand the import of this assertion. 299 One scholar
argues that "[a] necessary predicate to meaningful, effective litigation is the
attorney's advice to her client about the client's legal rights and the proposed
course of action." 300 If litigation is the only recourse to ensure the protection of
certain rights, any law that threatens to interfere with associated legal advice
should be regarded with suspicion. 30 1
Further, as noted by amici in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the En-

couragement Restriction could conceivably reach:
[A]n attorney who tells her client that she should remain in the
country while contesting removal-because, for example, noncitizens within the United States have greater due process rights than
non-citizens outside the United States, or because, as a practical
matter, the government may not physically remove her until removal
proceedings are completed.302
Although some might argue (indeed, many have) that the government has no
interest in prosecuting lawyers for giving legal advice, the government has in
the past demonstrated its willingness to bring these cases forward.303 In United
States v. Henderson, for example, the government argued that immigration
lawyers violate the Encouragement Restriction when they counsel their clients to
remain in the country while their cases are determined. 30 4 The Hendersonprosecution also argued that a lawyer's advice that some relief might not be available
297

See id. at 642-43 ("The role of an attorney in navigating and, when necessary, challenging the

law is a critical component of American democratic government.").
298
299
3 00

Id. at 643.
See Obergfell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Knake, supra note 296, at 645 (referencing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,430 (1963)).

301 Id. at 644. Professor Knake quotes Professor James Fischer, who warned that "legislative

control 'over lawyer practice may come to erode the ability of lawyers to serve as a bulwark against
the aggrandizement of government power vis a vis the individual."' Id. (quoting James M. Fischer,
External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 97 (2006)).
302

Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 484-85.

303 See id. at 485 (noting that "the government has already shown its intent to prosecute those

citizens (attorneys or sympathetic lay persons) who give even general immigration advice" (citing

United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D. Mass. 2012))).
3

See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (noting that the government argued that "giving illegal
aliens advice to remain in the United States while their status is disputed constitutes felonious conduct
under [the Encouragement Restriction] because it constitutes encouragement or inducement under the
statute").
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if an undocumented client left the country is comparable to "a criminal defense
lawyer who advises a client regarding the prospective robbery of a bank." 305
Two relatively recent cases might shed some light on the value that the
Supreme Court places on legal advice. In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA. v.
United States, the Supreme Court in 2010 refused to uphold the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's decision to hold the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 constitutionally overbroad. 30 6
The Eighth Circuit took issue with the statute's attempt to restrict lawyers from
advising clients to incur additional debt before declaring bankruptcy. 30 7 The
intent of this statute is to prohibit a lawyer from advising a client to incur additional debt without any intent of honoring the obligation; however, it also
could reach lawful advice. For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that a lawyer
might be prohibited from providing "advice constituting prudent prebankruptcy planning that is not an attempt to circumvent, abuse, or undermine the bankruptcy laws." 308 The Supreme Court disagreed, construing the statute to restrict
advice that is designed to "manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy system." 30 9 In a similar manner, consider how the Supreme Court might view an
attorney's advice to an undocumented immigrant on the specific type of legal
entity that would avoid the reach of IRCA's Employment Restriction. It is not
unfathomable that the Supreme Court, citing Milavetz, could conclude that although such advice is not designed to promote unlawful activity (owning a
business is, after all, legal), it is impermissibly designed to "manipulate" the
dictates of IRCA.
At this point, it might be appropriate to point out that there are a number
of lawyers providing advice to undocumented immigrants on various forms of
business ownership, including those that avoid IRCA's Employment Restrictions, and it appears that none of these lawyers have been prosecuted under IRCA's Encouragement Restriction. This prosecutorial restraint is laudable,
but does not provide much comfort. After all, the Henderson court goes to
great lengths to question the "dogged consistency" that the government's zeal
reflects to pursue the case against a well-meaning employer of an undocu-

30s

See id. at 203-04 (noting that "an unadorned plain meaning reading of the [Encouragement

Restriction] can lead to the conclusion that advice about what an [undocumented immigrant] needs to
do-including the need for an [undocumented immigrant] to remain in the United States-in order to
seek to adjust the [undocumented immigrant's] status could support the conclusion that such advice is
within the scope of [the Encouragement Restriction]").

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231 (2010).
Id. at 239.
30
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2008), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229.
309 Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 243.
306

307
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mented immigrant.310 The court heralded the virtues of prosecutorial restraint,
quoting Justice Robert Jackson, 311 Justice Louis Brandeis,3 12 an apocryphal
maxim attributed to the Athenian historian Thucydides, and Shakespeare. 313
The Henderson court's intellectual musings on the appropriate use of
power, while impressive, are a bit beside the point. The more concerning issue
is not the potential for the government to occasionally exhibit inappropriate
zeal, but rather the possibility of chilling protected speech.314 For this reason,
any responsible analysis of constitutional overbreadth should not consider
prosecutorial intent. As noted in Stevens, "the First Amendment protects
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige.
We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly."3 15 Thus, any lack of prosecutions of lawyers for violations of the Encouragement Restriction is irrelevant. The mere
threat of the possibility of such prosecution is enough to recommend striking
down the Encouragement Restriction.
B. Rendering State Laws and Policies Ineffective

A plain reading of the Encouragement Restriction not only has the potential to reach legal advice, but it also threatens a number of state policies and
laws. Take, for example, the fact that thirteen states and the District of Columbia currently allow undocumented people to obtain driver's licenses. 3 16 These
states might consider this necessary for undocumented people to lead more
comfortable lives by lessening an ever-present fear of driving without proper
documentation. Advocates highlight the fact that many undocumented people

30

Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 193-94, 212.

See id. at 212 (quoting former U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson who said that "the
citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness" (citing Robert H. Jack311

son, The FederalProsecutor,24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 18, 20 (1940))).
312 See id. ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." (quoting Justice Brandeis's dissent in

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
313 Id. at 213-14 (quoting DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S
LEGAL APPEAL 55 (1994)). The court in Henderson mentions that Thucydides stated that "[o]f all
manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most." Id. at 213 & n.13 (citing Walter Lippmann,
Today and Tomorrow, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1944, at A4). In addition, the case cites Shakespeare's
comment that, "O, it is excellent [t]o have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous [t]o use it like a giant." Id. at 214 (citing KORNSTEIN, supra, at 55).
314

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) ("The Constitution gives signifi-

cant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere.").
315

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).

316 See Mendoza & Polkey, supra note 129.
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have children who are U.S. citizens, and an inability to obtain a driver's license
makes it difficult to take those children to school, doctors, and any number of
other necessary activities. 317 Further, these policies are often justified by focusing on the safety of all drivers, recognizing that an undocumented person with
a driver's license is less likely to flee the scene of an accident and is more likely to cooperate with authorities. In Minnesota, for example, a county sheriff
highlighted this benefit by testifying that undocumented immigrants "will be
less likely to flee the scene if they get in an accident because of their status"
and expressed optimism that "it will also make people more comfortable coming to the police for any issues." 318 Advocates for this policy in Wisconsin cite
potential benefits to both safety and the economy. 319 From an economic perspective, advocates note that Wisconsin's "farms rely on immigrant labor and
they're located in rural areas, so really the only way for those peoples' employees to get to work is for them to drive." 320 In terms of safety, advocates
emphasize that extending the right for undocumented people to obtain driver's
licenses will not only require those drivers to take driving safety tests, but also
allow such drivers to obtain car insurance. 32 1

317 See Monsy Alvarado, The Pressure Is on to Let Undocumented Immigrants Get NJ Driver's
Licenses, USA TODAY NETWORK N.J. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/newjersey/2019/03/04/push-vote-allow-nj-drivers-licenses-undocumented-immigrants/3015254002/ [https://
perma.cc/J7TS-GCWB] ("In New Jersey, 168,000 children have undocumented parents who cannot
drive them to and from school, their doctor's appointments, sports games and practices, and other
activities and errands parents make with their children." (quoting a policy analyst from New Jersey
Policy Perspective, Erika J. Nava)). California's program, for example, was intended to help undocumented people "drive to work, take their kids to school in the morning or go see the doctor without
fear that their car is going to be impounded." Andrea Castillo, CaliforniaDriver'sLicense Program
for Those HereIllegally Surpasses] Million Drivers, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.latimes.

com/local/lanow/la-me-dmv-illegal-immigration-licenses-20180404-story.html [https://perma.cc/
Z4PZ-KVKG] (quoting Luis Alejo, the assemblyman who wrote the bill allowing undocumented
people to obtain driver's licenses in California).
318 See David Chanen, Hennepin County Sheriff Endorses Bill for Driver's Licenses for Immigrants Here Illegally, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2019), http://www.startribune.com/hennepin-countysheriff-endorses-bill-for-driver-s-licenses-for-immigrants-here-illegally/506909692/ [https://perma.cc/
PL8Z-JQUT] (quoting Hennepin County Sheriff Dave Hutchinson). The article notes: "[Minnesota]
Attorney General Keith Ellison said he backs the legislation as a matter of public safety and 'of help-

ing people live with dignity."' Id.
319 Phoebe Petrovic, Evers' Budget Proposes Extending Eligibilityfor Driver'sLicenses, In-State
Tuition to Immigrants, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.wpr.org/evers-budget-proposesextending-eligibility-drivers-licenses-state-tuition-immigrants [https://perma.cc/4S2U-CDYY] ("[P]ermitting immigrants living in the country without documentation to obtain driver's licenses is both an
issue of economic development and public safety." (quoting the Dairy Business Association's director
of government affairs, John Holevoet)).
320 Id.
321 Id.

(quoting Holevoet).
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Although the justifications for the policy share similarities, each state
emphasizes different reasons for allowing undocumented people to obtain
driver's licenses. As summarized in a report by the Latino Policy Institute:
In Vermont, for example, the legislation to grant driving privileges to
the undocumented immigrants of the state made economic sense, because most undocumented immigrants living in Vermont work on
dairy farms, which are a substantial contributor to Vermont's economy. Granting the undocumented population in Vermont driving privileges ensured that these workers could get to work. Nevada enacted
similar legislation for public safety reasons. The premise of the legislation in Nevada was that issuing driving privileges to the undocumented population would ensure that drivers would have to pass driver's education and driving tests. Nevada also required that recipients
of driving privileges purchase car insurance, ensuring the availability
of greater resources for accident victims. Colorado's justification for
the legislation was that the cost of car insurance premiums will not
increase due to losses caused by undocumented immigrants. 32 2
Similar arguments are echoed in New York,3 23 Rhode Island,32 4 and Massachusetts.325 Regardless of the justifications, a broad construction of the Encouragement Restriction would ignore each of these arguments and could, for example,
punish a person for driving an undocumented person to the state agency that issues driver's licenses. Helping them obtain a legal means of moving about the
country suggests that the driver would be impermissibly encouraging an undocumented person to stay in the United States. For similar reasons, an insurance
agent selling an undocumented person auto insurance might also be prosecuted.
Regardless of whether such an outcome is beyond the intended scope of the Encouragement Restriction, these policies represent the type of state laws that
might run afoul of a broadly construed Encouragement Restriction.
The examples of state laws and policies that might result in multiple violations of the Encouragement Restriction are not limited to states that permit
322 DEBORAH GONZALEZ ET AL., LATINO POLICY INST., A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF

DRIVER'S LICENSES FOR UNDOCUMENTED RHODE ISLANDERS 3 (2016).
323

Kelsey O'Connor, Local Legislators SupportBill to GrantDriver'sLicenses Regardless of Im-

migration Status, ITHACA VOICE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://ithacavoice.com/2019/03/local-legislatorssupport-bill-to-grant-drivers-licenses-regardless-of-immigration-status/ [https://perma.cc/XY6J-KHZ6].
324 Steve Ahlquist, Legislation to Allow Undocumented Immigrants Driver's Licenses Introduced., UPRISE RI (Mar. 1, 2019), https://upriseri.com/2019-03-01-drivers-licenses/ [https://perma.

cc/X9F4-3KSZ].
325 Chris Lisinski, Lawmakers Push Bill Making Undocumented ImmigrantsEligibleforDriver's

Licenses, WBUR NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/01/23/undocumentedimmigrants-drivers-licenses-bill [https://perma.cc/WE8S-A7FN].
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driver's licenses. For example, there are a number of states that extend in-state
tuition benefits to undocumented students. 326 Some states go further, extending
in-state tuition to undocumented people and providing state-financed financial
aid and scholarships.327 Many of these states require the applicants to have attended middle and high school within the state.328 These policies clearly provide an incentive (in-state tuition) for undocumented people to remain in the
state (at least for high school and undergraduate study). Consider the following
examples of benign actions that would arguably violate the Encouragement
Restriction: a high school counselor explaining in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students who aspire to go to college; a well-meaning neighbor
encouraging a high school student to continue to reside in a particular state, in
order to maintain the potential in-state tuition benefit; and a college financial
aid advisor who identifies the state financial aid packages available to undocumented students. Each of these activities would appear to be a clear case of
impermissible encouragement, even though they are furthering a state policy.
Beyond driver's licenses and higher education benefits, a broadly construed Encouragement Restriction might also interfere with workers' compensation laws that classify undocumented workers as employees in the event the
person is injured on the job.329 To justify the inclusion of undocumented people under the protections of workers' compensation laws, advocates note that
"Latino workers, including both immigrants and non-immigrants, suffer fatal
326

See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 68130.5

(West 2018) The bill was passed as Assembly Bill 540

and signed into law in 2001. There are at least nineteen states that extend in-state tuition benefits to undocumented people.
32 Ashley A. Smith, PromotingTuition-FreeProgramsto UndocumentedStudents, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/03/12/more-states-are-encouragingundocumented-students-pursue-tuition-free-programs [https://perma.cc/SF9N-QL4N]. The article notes:
Maryland, which is starting its Promise Scholarship program this year, and New York,
which passed legislation in January to extend state aid to undocumented students, are
the latest states to join California, Delaware, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washington in
offering financial aid and grants or scholarships to students who live in those states but
lack legal-immigrant status.

Id.
328 See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, An Assist for DACA Students, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/09/new-michigan-state-tuition-requirements-helpundocumented-daca-students [https://perma.cc/5YES-K48A] ("Under the new policy, students can
establish their residency in Michigan, and thus qualify for in-state tuition, by attending a middle
school in the state for at least two years. They then must earn a GED or graduate from an in-state high
school that they attended for at least three years.").
329 DEBORAH BERKOWITZ, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIMITING WORKERS' COMP BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 1 (2017), https://www.nelp.org/
publication/unintended-consequences-limiting-workers-comp-benefits-undocumented-workers/
[https://perma.cc/8E5Y-Z8N8] ("Almost all states either explicitly or implicitly include undocumented workers in their workers' compensation statutes.").
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workplace injuries at an alarmingly higher rate than other workers in the U.S.
workforce." 330 If states were to exclude undocumented people from workers'
compensation protections, they would effectively "encourage unscrupulous
employers to hire undocumented workers and then use their immigration status
as a shield to escape full responsibility for on-the-job injuries."331 By way of
example, Case Farm, one of the largest poultry companies in the country,
built its business by recruiting some of the world's most vulnerable
immigrants, who endure harsh and at times illegal conditions that
few Americans would put up with. When these workers have fought
for higher pay and better conditions, the company has used their
immigration status to get rid of vocal workers, avoid paying for injuries, and quash dissent.332
Thus, there are a multitude of consequences that will potentially flow from a
broad construction of the Employment Restriction.
C. Public Universities and PrivateCorporations

A number of private entities, public institutions, and individual U.S. citizens currently engage in activities that could conceivably be covered by the
Encouragement Restriction. With respect to public institutions, consider the
following statement: "The University of Michigan encourages the application
and enrollment of undocumented students-as well as students who receive
benefits under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programwho are academically excellent and accomplished in extracurricular endeavors."3 33 Similar policies can be found on public university websites across the
country.334 To justify these policies, University of Michigan President Mark

330

Id.

See id. ("That would give employers who cheat an unfair advantage over employers who play
by the rules. States should not create financial incentives to ignore health and safety laws.").
332 Grabell, supra note 181.
331

33 See UndocumentedStudents, U. MICH., https://admissions.umich.edu/undoc-students [https://
perma.cc/UFV9-HLP5]. DACA provided temporary protection from deportation for certain undocumented people. See DeferredActionfor ChildhoodArrivals(DACA), DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/TL7K-CQH7].
33 See, e.g., Undocumented Students-All Students Welcome at UConn, UCONN OFFICE OF STUDENT FIN. AID SERVS., https://financialaid.uconn.edu/undocumented-students/# [https://perma.cc/
8B49-TDZ8]. The university's website notes:
The University of Connecticut encourages all academically accomplished students who
are ready to take the next step in reaching their higher educational goals to apply for
admission, regardless of citizenship status. This includes students who may just be
learning their immigration status for the first time during the college admissions process. Admission to the University is based on a holistic approach which includes grade
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Schlissel said undocumented students "enrich" the University of Michigan's
community with their "many talents, hard work, and the diverse perspectives
and life experiences." 33 5 Such a statement, a laudatory pronouncement that the
school would like undocumented students to apply and attend a particular
school, would likely violate a broadly construed Encouragement Restriction.
After all, this statement literally encourages ("The University of Michigan encourages") undocumented immigrants to apply to college. Combined with the
fact that around ninety-seven percent of the freshmen reside on campus, this
statement clearly encourages an undocumented person to reside in the United
States. Given that a number of schools have similarly placed a high value on
undocumented students, it seems like a poor policy decision to enforce a law
that would make it impossible to recruit such students.336
A broad construction of the Encouragement Restriction also potentially
affects the actions of private businesses. For example, in the face of the Trump
Administration's threats to end the DACA program, a number of companies
spoke out to support renewal of the program.337 The President of Microsoft
famously said that if the government wanted to deport Microsoft employees
point average, class rank, SAT or ACT score, required essay, extracurricular activities,
and optional letters of recommendation.

Id.
335 Protecting the Interests of Our InternationalCommunity of Scholars, U. MICH. (Jan. 28,
2017), https://president.umich.edu/news-communications/on-the-agenda/protecting-the-interests-ofour-international-community-of-scholars/ [https://perma.cc/TBR2-YDQW];Statement onDACAfrom
PresidentMark Schlissel, U. MICH. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, (Sept. 3, 2017), https://president.
umich.edu/news-communications/statements/statement-on-daca-from-president-mark-schlissel/

[https://perma.cc/5ZYN-ME5Z].
336 In a similar vein, it is likely that the Encouragement Restriction might hinder private organizations from providing scholarships for undocumented students. It is hard to imagine how the provision
of scholarship funds, which may be used not only for tuition and books, but also room and board (i.e.,
residence), could be considered anything less than encouragement of undocumented people to reside
in the United States. See, e.g., PepsiCo Cesar Chavez Latino Scholarship, CESAR CHAVEZ FOUND.,
https://chavezfoundation.org/CCFscholarship [https://pema.cc/3BH8-SL5R] (describing the Chavez
Foundation's PepsiCo Cesar Chavez Latino Scholarship Fund that "provides $300,000 in scholarship
awards to qualified Latino students in Arizona and California regardless of national origin or immigration status in an effort to promote their academic success"); Undocupoets, SIBLING RIVALRY PRESS,
https://www.siblingrivalrypress.com/undocupoets-fellowship/ [https://perma.cc/94MB-ATG3] (describing its fellowship providing a cash award to undocumented poets); What Should I Know?, GOLDEN DOOR SCHOLARS, https://www.goldendoorscholars.org/future-scholars [https://perma.cc/23M9TNQX] (stating that the organization "lights the way for [DACA] Dreamers to invest in their education and to achieve their career goals beyond what they might imagine").
33? Joseph Hincks, CEOsfrom More Than 400 Leading U.S. Companies Urge Trump to Keep

DACA, FORTUNE (Sept. 5, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/09/05/daca-trump-dreamers-businessleaders/ [https://perma.cc/T7LF-48P8] ("Some of America's largest companies have thrown their
weight behind a campaign urging President Donald Trump not to scrap an Obama-era program that
protects undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children from being
deported.").
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with DACA status, "it's going to have to go through us." 338 It is reasonable to
assume that this statement, however intended, encouraged any undocumented
Microsoft employees, in that it would fill them with hope. Such hope might
reasonably lead undocumented people to continue to reside in the United
States, comfortable in the knowledge that their employer promised to protect
them. As such, the statement violates the plain meaning of the Encouragement
Restriction.

As further evidence of the reach of this statute, consider the fact that the
Encouragement Restriction not only affects Microsoft, one of the largest companies in the U.S., but also organized labor. A number of unions have begun to
provide support to their undocumented members. For example, the Painters
Union Local 82 secured an attorney for Hugo Mejfa Murgufa, an undocumented union member, when Mr. Murgufa was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 339 Not content to stop with legal representation, the
union "went all out on his behalf, holding rallies around the country to stop his
deportation," ultimately resulting in public pressure that led to Mr. Murgufa
receiving relief from deportation. 340 To the extent such activity might not
amount to encouragement, take note of Mr. Murgufa's statement: "A couple
times I tried to quit. It was just so hard to stay far from my family. . . . When
[the union] gave me letters and this support, that got me excited and I didn't
feel so alone about my case." 34 1 The activities of the union in Mr. Murgufa's
case clearly meet the dictionary definition of encouragement often used by
courts: "to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope." Further, this is not an isolated
event, as many unions have taken steps to advocate for their undocumented
members.342
Finally, consider the effect that a robust Encouragement Restriction might
have on people who live near or in municipalities or states that have publicly
fought federal efforts to use local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration law. Generally speaking, these efforts, often referred to as "sanctuary"
laws, "restrict cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immi338 Aarti Shahani, Microsoft President to Trump: To Deport a DREAMer, You'll Have to Go

Through Us, NPR (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/05/548686695/
250-apple-employees-among-thousands-at-risk-from-daca-cancellation [https://perma.cc/DR6J-DBSN].
33 Mike Elk, Undocumented Workers Find New Ally as Unions Act to Halt Deportations,THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/22/unions-undocumentedworkers-immigration-deportation-painters [https://perma.cc/GW79-PHQY].
34 See id. ("Finally, on 22 November, after 204 days in detention, he was released as a result of
his union's activism in public and in court, winning a stay on political asylum grounds.").
341

Id.

342 See, e.g., Alvarado, supra note 317 (discussing the fact that in New Jersey, "13 leaders of

labor unions across the state sent a letter to Gov. Phil Murphy, state Senate President Stephen
Sweeney ... and [Assembly Speaker] Coughlin . . lobbying for them to take action on the measure"
to permit undocumented people to obtain driver's licenses).
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gration authorities by denying ICE access to jails or not complying with detainer requests." 34 3 Thus, if local law enforcement held an undocumented immigrant for a minor offense, they might receive a request to detain the individual until federal immigration authorities could assume custody. Sanctuary laws
provide explicit permission for the local authority to ignore such requests.
Given the potential emotional devastation of losing a family member to deportation for something as minor as driving without a license (especially if the
person lives in a state that does not issue licenses to undocumented people), it
is not far-fetched to assume that well-meaning people might encourage undocumented families to relocate to a nearby sanctuary city. Imagine turning to an
undocumented friend and saying: "You know, you should really consider moving to Nevada, because then at least you could get a driver's license. I'd be
happy to help with the moving costs." Such a simple, well-meaning act might
be considered unlawful encouragement under a broad reading of the Encouragement Restriction.
CONCLUSION

Despite the uncertain reach of IRCA's Encouragement Restriction, transactional lawyers across the country provide invaluable legal advice to undocumented people in an effort to help them achieve financial stability. If IRCA's
Encouragement Restriction were to discourage this legal advice, it would rob
many undocumented people of their best financial option, deprive federal,
state, and local governments of a powerful revenue source, and further incentivize unscrupulous employers to exploit the vulnerability of undocumented
workers. Further, a broad reading of the Encouragement Restriction might
negatively affect a number of socially productive activities. The Ninth Circuit's decision to strike down IRCA's Encouragement Restriction was sound
from a doctrinal perspective, in that it refused to engage in a statutory interpretation that amounts to re-writing the statute. But more importantly, it represents
good policy. The decision was a breath of fresh air for the many advocates,
lawyers, family members, and friends who daily engage in activity that might
be perceived as unlawful encouragement.

4 Christina Goldbaum, State Courts Become BattlegroundOver Trump's Sanctuary Cities Policy,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/nyregion/sanctuary-cities-statecourts.html [https://perma.cc/2KYU-Q94B]; see also Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding

"Sanctuary Cities," 59 B.C. L. REv. 1703, 1713-19 (2018) (discussing the Trump Administration's
pursuits to end sanctuary cities).

